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## Next Steps on Policing – Review

15 May 2005

DCC Colin Smith

UK Chief Police Advisor - Iraq

### 1. Terms of Reference

- 1.1 To review UK Policing support to the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS):
  - 1.11 Review current priorities
  - 1.12 Resources currently available
  - 1.13 Identify resources required to achieve priorities
  - 1.14 Proposals to resource any gap between 1.12 and 1.13

### 2. Review

- 2.1 I do not regard my agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) as 'Confidential' but useful as a 'Mission Statement' setting out the tasks for the next 12 months of UK effort in both Baghdad and Basra. I attach a copy of ToR agreed with FCO at **Appendix A**.
- 2.2 I am cognizant of, and contributed toward, the recent 'Review of GCPP Funded Police and Prison Work in Iraq'. It is noteworthy that ALL of the 14 Recommendations in the Report (090505) have either been implemented by, or subject to, my appointment. I concur with all the Recommendations. I attach a copy at **Appendix B**.
- 2.3 In order to be timely and useful under operational pressures and constraints this review must be, and will be brief.
- 2.4 The appointment of a UK Chief Police Advisor, Iraq with direction and control over all UK policing assets (including those under ArmorGroup) will help in moving valuable resources to meet the identified priorities.

### 3. Priorities

- 3.1 The attached ToR is the first clear statement of UK intent in respect of support to the development of the IPS in Iraq (both Baghdad and Basra). Priorities fall into two distinct areas: Strategic Priorities in respect of UK influence in Baghdad and Operational (implementation) priorities in MND (SE) in Basra. They are not mutually

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exclusive and as I will indicate, in some cases intransigently linked (Intelligence). For clarity I will deal with each separately:

### **Baghdad**

- 3.2 It is clear that current UK resources in Baghdad are dwarfed by the increase in US equivalent. Whilst always proportionately greater than UK this has demonstrably grown in recent months as the US priority, post General Gary LUCK visit in January 2005, has moved from 'warfighting' to 'iraqification'. This is particularly true in respect of development of the IPS. Initial UK influence in several areas has gone or been substantially weakened. As programmes have been developed, resource gaps have been identified. UK inability to significantly fill these gaps has inevitably resulted in the US doing so, diminishing UK influence. Priority areas include Intelligence, Crime Investigation, Training, and Strategic Development.
- 3.3 UK inability to 'walk the talk' and tendency to write long, strategic doctrinal papers (often targeted at the wrong levels and individuals) has been interpreted by the US as typical British procrastination. The US clarion call (not totally untypical of our own Military) is enunciated by Lt General PETRAEUS, Head of MNFSTC-I as 'Action, Action and Action'.
- 3.4 In order to increase influence at the Strategic Level we need to focus activity over the next 12 months on the key targeted areas. These are indicated in the ToR, but need to be seen as Primary and Secondary:

#### **Primary**

- 3.5 **Strategic Development of the IPS.** I have verbally agreed this with my US Counterpart, Steve CASTEEL, US Department of State (DoS) Advisor to MOI. This needs to be pitched at the Minister level. On 120505, at the Minister's specific request, I gave a short presentation (10 minutes) to his MOI Structure Conference in Baghdad, comprising senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Chief of Police (CoPs) and Governors. This was the only non-Iraqi input. It should be noted to sustain this is going to require 'herculean efforts' and interpersonal skills in the face of strong US, particularly US Military, desire for hegemony over IPS development. (An alliance of interest with DoS and IPLOs (US CivPol advisors) is a potential channel). The recent decision of General PETRAEUS. MNSTC-I to put the 20 CPATT IPLO's under GC MND (SE) command is at best misguided and at worst a major difficulty. GC MND (SE) now has his own private US Police Advisors!! It is clear that at senior level in Baghdad the US Authorities have not been made aware that we have done things more professionally in MNDSE with senior serving CivPol Officers leading on IPS Development. This has not occurred in US areas of control. In effect CPATT will now send instructions, communications via the Military chain rather than via CPA - I.

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- 3.6 There are currently no resources, except myself dedicated to this key activity. A need for a senior UK Civil Servant (Home Office) with experience in Police Strategic Development and Police Structure has been identified.
- 3.7 **Intelligence (and Crime Investigation).** This is identified as one of the few areas where the UK still has a foothold. This has, co-incidentally arisen through the attachment to the UK Team, of . . . still heads the Intelligence Project and 'sits at the top table'. This is a key area for resources. Requirements: a senior experienced Special Branch or Intelligence Officer with UK national experience. Additional skills required include a Crime Analyst and a Systems/IT advisor. The UK Team have developed the 'TIPS' Programme (a Confidential Telephone Hotline) which is producing both good intelligence and a means of training basic Informant Handling techniques to the police. One post is dedicated to development of Forensic Capability. A key post that should be continued which links to similar development in MND (SE).
- 3.8 **Policing Centre of Excellence.** Resourced mainly from two senior Canadian Colleagues on the Team, but assisted by all, including myself, this provides a focus for policing issues across Iraq and Internationally. This is a small resource but a disproportionate influence. It helps to 'fly the flag' for policing in a land dominated by the Military.

### Secondary

- 3.9 **Baghdad Police Training Academy.** The UK currently has substantial resources invested in direct IPS Training – the largest non-US contingent (58) at Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) and runs (Director and 22 trainers), with Czech, Danish and Italian (Carabinieri) input, the Regional Police Academy at Az Zubayr near to Basra City. We currently have senior representation at Deputy Director Level at the Baghdad Academy and two trainers. This can still be sustained if sufficient skilled individuals are available. It is likely in the near future that Senior/Middle Officer Training will commence at the Academy. This is an area which could give access to the future IPS leaders and one I would like to target our resources..
- 3.10 **Ancillary Advisors.** A small number of advisors who occupy operational support posts, e.g. a Hostage/Kidnap Advisor. This post has been very high profile and the current post holder has played a pivotal role in MNF response. He has been highly praised by the NSY SO13 Team investigating the kidnap and murder of Margaret HASSAN. This can be sustained if a skilled individual is available (urgent).

### **Basra**

- 3.11 Whilst Baghdad has been the 'strategic' centre for IPS Development, Basra has been the central focus of UK involvement, particularly in terms of resources.

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- 3.12 British 'run' MND (SE) comprises the four Provinces of Basra, Maysan, Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar (local spellings differ). Senior Police Advisor Iraq (South) has been the CivPol lead in Basra and Maysan since start of mission in July 2003. Muthanna was, until March 2005, under the control of the Dutch Military supported by a large contingent of Dutch Military Police. Police lead was effectively from Dutch Senior Military Commander to GOC MND (SE) through Security Sector Reform (SSR) – the Divisional RMP Provost Marshall or Colonel equivalent. In March 2005 Muthanna Province came under direct UK control and CivPol assets were deployed as soon as available. Dhi Qar, under Italian Military control, remains as per Al Muthanna until March this year i.e. link to GOC through SSR.
- 3.13 Priority across the 3 Provinces is now to implement the '**12 Month IPS Development Strategy and Plan**'. Copy of Strategy attached at **Appendix C**. (The Development Plan is not included - a 'live' document (of 50 pages) it is ongoing) This has received wide circulation and consultation with all stakeholders, particularly Iraqi CoP's. The Strategy prioritises activity in 5 key areas – Training, Operational Capability, Intelligence, Supporting Infrastructure and Public Support. It will concentrate on areas that have 'Iraqi buy in', are achievable within 12 months and importantly, sustainable (by the Iraqis), beyond 12 months. Accompanying plans and resource taskings have been undertaken with Military, ArmorGroup and CPATT IPLOs. A Coordinating Group, including CivPol and AG is being established at 4 Div HQ, Basra Air Station' to further priorities and allocate resources. Police/Military Teams will co-ordinate implementation across the Provinces. Whilst this Strategy, long overdue in MND (SE), was being rolled out CPATT in Baghdad started to rollout the 'Police, Partnership Programme' (P3) across Iraq. The '12 Month IPS Development Plan' and P3 are identical and complimentary in most terms of areas covered and implementation. The US administration have failed to realize (or acknowledge) the role of CivPol in MND (SE) and directed Military direction of P3 across ALL Provinces. Despite some tensions this is being resolved locally
- 3.14 The **Regional Police Training Academy** at Az Zubayr (AZ) was a UK initiative from 2003, initially as Basra Provincial Training but then 'adopted' by the MOI as a Regional Academy. 23 officers, predominately CivPol, have conducted Basic, Development and Management Courses.
- 3.15 With effect from May 2005 all IPS Basic Recruit Training will be carried out at JIPTC or Baghdad Academy. JIPTC is scheduled to be closed in late 2006. AZ will remain important in conducting continuation, TIP, specialist and development training. It will have an important role over the next 12 months in training and developing Iraqi Trainers to take over the majority of police training, except specialist courses.

### Current Resources

- 4.0 Whilst I am cognizant of the number of persons currently in post, I am unsighted on what is the overall 'staffing' allocation or budget for Iraq. There is no clear indication of

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the number of posts that are budgeted by the FCO either in Baghdad or Basra. The posts appear to have been allocated on a locally/centrally identified basis. Some posts are currently unfilled e.g. Deputy Post in Basra or have been filled to fulfill a short term requirement. Where a suitable replacement has not been found posts, particularly training have been re-allocated.

- 4.1 This is not a personal failing on any department but reflects a sometimes unstructured approach. This has been hampered by a number of factors – the division of responsibilities between Basra and Baghdad, lack of overall command and co-ordination between Baghdad, Basra and Az Zubayr, distinct contractual arrangements between CivPol posts, lack of integration of ArmorGroup officers into overall structure and above all a lack of a Development Strategy and Plan setting priorities against which long term resources can be committed.
- 4.2 The current 6 month posting policy has itself created difficulties. Allowing for R & R, induction etc a seconded officer is likely to spend a little over 4 months on the ground in Iraq. Extensions and renewals, whilst welcome, have done little to help continuity. A 'handover' period is a luxury. Many officers have departed weeks or months before their replacement.
- 4.3 Current resource allocation (wef 150505) is as follows. A comprehensive spreadsheet of posts and expected arrivals against my priorities is attached at **Appendix D**.

Chief Police Advisor Iraq  
SO to CPA I

Deputy Chief Constable  
Chief Inspector

4.4 **Baghdad**

Deputy to CPA I

C/Supt. (Note: This has been a Canadian Officer attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO. Now vacant. A further secondment not likely for 3 or 4 months)

Project Leader – Crime & Forensics

Supt. (Note: This is been a Canadian Officer attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO)

Project Leader – Intelligence

Intelligence Officer (Note: This is been attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO – will need replacing shortly by a UK Officer))

Support Team Manager

Inspector

TIPs Team (wef 110505)

1 D/Sergeant

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	3 Constables
Hostage and Kidnap Advisor	Police Constable
Deputy Director Baghdad Academy	Chief Inspector 2 Training Officers (currently vacant)
Interpreter	Local Employed Staff

#### 4.5 Basra

The Organisational Chart attached at **Appendix E** sets out the current allocation of posts:

Deputy to CPA –I (Basra)	Superintendent (post vacant since 0205)
CivPol Advisor to Cop (Basra)	Superintendent (+1 AG Deputy)
CivPol Advisor to Cop (Maysan)	Superintendent (+1 AG Deputy)
CivPol Advisor to Cop (Al Muthanna)	Chief Inspector (+1 AG Deputy)
Training Co-Coordinator	Chief Inspector (+1 AG Support)
Projects	Chief Inspector (+5 AG on Intel.)
Police Liaison Officer to Military	Chief Inspector
Military Liaison Officer to Police	Military (Major)
Team Support Manager	Inspector (+1 AG Support)
Crime and Forensic Advisor	Civilian (+5 AG Support)

4.6 There are 70+ ArmorGroup Officers working in the 3 Provinces. They have been increasingly integrated both into training provision through the IPS 12 Month Development Plan but also into the support structure, providing additional administration support, deputy cover (retired C/Inspectors and Supt) to CivPol Advisors and specific project support – Forensic and Intelligence. They are a very flexible resource and can be deployed against priorities.

4.7 The importance of extending the ArmorGroup Contract **cannot be over emphasised.** UK resource involvement in Iraq has been increasingly dwarfed by the scale of US, US Military and UK Military deployments. The costing of ArmorGroup per officer against CivPol is interesting. They provide an essential asset. What is needed is clearer direction to ArmorGroup of the skills profiles required. I am assured by them that they can meet those requirements. CivPol cannot meet the major priorities without ArmorGroup support. A major redrafting of priorities would be necessary.

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4.8 **Az Zubayr (AZ) Regional Training Academy**

The attached Organisational Chart sets out the current allocation and strength

Director of Training	Chief Inspector
Deputies, Trainers etc.	20

Additional resources (2 officers) are provided by ArmorGroup.

- 4.9 As previously indicated a comprehensive report covering all current postholders, end of tour dates, expected arrivals, replacements etc and new posts against priorities, is being prepared with my staff officer. This will follow shortly. It is in effect a further Appendix.

**Resources Against Priorities**

- 5.1 The priorities in **Baghdad** are set out in Paras 3.5 to 3.9 above.

- 5.2 Resource requirements to meet these priorities:

Deputy to CPA –I (Baghdad)	C/Supt.
Advisor On Strategic Policy and Structure	Senior Civilian.
Intelligence Project Head	C/Supt or Civ Equivalent
Intelligence Support	2 posts (NCIS/Sec Service)
TIPs Team	1 D/Sergeant
	3 Constables
Crime and Forensic Advisor	Skill Based (C/Insp?)
Kidnap and Hostage Advisor	Skill based (D/Insp?)
Police Centre Excellence	2 CivPol posts (Canadian or overseas if possible)
Deputy Director Training Baghdad Academy Trainers (2)	C/Inspector or Supt Constables.
Support Team Manager	Inspector
Interpreter	Serving Arabic Speaking Officer

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5.3 The latter post is an opportunity to deploy a serving UK police officer to Iraq as Official Interpreter to CPA – I. Difficulties are being experienced with the current locally employed interpreter. Despite him being the son of a police general it has been indicated that he is not 'invited' to senior MOI meetings I have attended. This makes my work increasingly difficult. I know that finding an officer with this skill will be difficult. It might however be an opportunity to develop language capabilities for an officer.

5.4 The priorities in **Basra** are set out in Paras 3.10 to 3.12 above.

The posts required are as set out in Para 4.5 above with the addition:

Deputy to CPA-I (Basra)	Chief Superintendent
SPA – I (Basra) (Cover to Deputy CPA-I)	Superintendent
CivPol Advisor (Al Muthanna)	Upgrade to Supt. Post
Head of Intelligence Project	Chief Inspector

5.5 The priorities in **Az Zubayr Academy** are set out in Paras 3.13 to 3.14 above.

The posts required are as set out in Para 4.6.

5.6 The total number of posts required is not anticipated to increase. Re-focusing of priorities to meet the IPS 12 Month Development Plan will necessitate moving officers from AZ to Provincial Academies (based at existing CivPol locations in Basra, Al Muthanna and Maysan). The movement of trainers to Baghdad Academy to fill the 2 posts is also under review. CPATT have offered 4 Trainers and an Administrator to support AZ courses – being pursued expeditiously.

### **Resource Gaps**

6.1 I have previously indicated that I am not aware of the overall staffing budget for IPS Development in Iraq.

6.2 It is anticipated that, without a dramatic change in circumstances in Iraq or governmental direction, there should, cognisant of Para 6.1 above, be no additional staffing resource requirements.

6.3 I am grateful for the work now being undertaken by \_\_\_\_\_ from the Embassy, Baghdad. She is seeking to identify potential funding sources and cost the 12 Month IPS Development Plan. The latter is proving difficult to qualify, particularly as work is still being prioritised and tasked.

6.4 I would comment;

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- The majority of costs incurred are 'staffing'. Additional capital costs (IT, equipment etc) are not expected to be high. The exceptions are the current proposal to extend SatNav Comms to CivPol and AG. The proposal is to joint fund with DfID.
- Substantial costings – station reconstruction, weapons, uniforms etc – is included within the MoD SSR budget. I have not accessed these costings.

6.5 This is qualified by the following criteria:

- ✓ Renewal of current Armor Group (AG) Contract.
- ✓ Further integration of AG officers into support roles for CivPol.
- ✓ Flexibility of contracts, terms and conditions to allow movement. within Iraq under overall control of CPA- I.
- ✓ Identification and matching of officer profiles with required skill sets.
- ✓ Major resource allocation by UK Military and CPATT (MND SE) into the IPS 12 Month Development Plan (agreed with GOC MND-SE). Particularly essential to meet challenging military drawdown plans in Al Muthanna and Maysan for end of 2005.
- ✓ Continued (and increased) support by ACPO and UK Forces to CivPol Mission in Iraq.
- ✓ Greater flexibility (risk assessed) in movement of CivPol officers, particularly in MND-SE

6.6 There are further opportunities to increase resource allocations at nil cost to budget:

- ✓ Approach to Commonwealth Partners (Australians, New Zealand etc) to second senior Police Officers to support Mission in Iraq. The Canadians currently provide 2 officers (one currently vacant). The Australians have a major military deployment in Al Muthanna – seconded officers could greatly support the CivPol effort there. These approaches need to be made quickly, at a senior level co-coordinated through Embassy Baghdad.
- ✓ A similar approach could be made to our European Partners. The EU Project headed by Stephen WHITE may assist in Senior IPS Officer development.
- ✓ Where direct officer secondment is not an option due to political concerns, funding of additional AG contracts – I am aware and have contributed to possible Japanese involvement in Al Muthanna – should be vigorously pursued. The more resources available the more tasks can be completed within the current timescales.
- ✓ Identification by Military of police officers currently serving as Territorial Army Reserve in MND SE and their attachment to joint Military/Police tasking and direction to drive forward the IPS 12 Month Development Plan. (GOC MND SE is aware)

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- ✓ Better co-ordination with CPATT and MNSTC -I to draw down some of the resources available in Baghdad into MND-SE (already underway through CPA-I)
- ✓ Better recruitment of recently retired police officers (notably RUC/PSNI) with required skill sets

### Concluding Comments

- 6.5 I repeat the 'health warning' made at the beginning reference the need to produce a quick report for Baghdad and London. Further reports in respect of more detailed personnel allocation and costings are currently being prepared and will be forwarded through Embassy.
- 6.6 I believe the priorities set are achievable within 12 months and within current resource allocation. The key driver is TIME. **Additional senior posts in Basra and Baghdad need to be identified and in country within 4 weeks (mid-June)**
- 6.7 We have failed in the past through lack of appropriate succession planning, handovers etc. Substantial effort has been put into driving UK effort forward in both Basra and, more recently, Baghdad. Progress in Iraq is hindered by communications, IT and movement constraints. We must not allow this or poor co-ordination with, and within, the UK to diminish this drive. CivPol have many critics in Iraq in the form of US (and UK) military. **We must not fail.**

Colin FW Smith  
Deputy Chief Constable  
UK Chief Police Advisor - Iraq

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## **Iraqi Police Service – Development Strategy.**

### **Strategic Aim.**

*“To develop an efficient, effective, credible and community supported police service”*

### **Strategic Intent.**

Whilst capability to counter insurgency and maintain public order is a current priority, the long term objective is for the development of a community based, accountable police service subject to political governance.

### **Strategic Principles.**

Current strategic development must:

- Be led by the Iraqi Police Service with the agreement and support of the key Iraqi stakeholders – Chief's of Police, Minister of the Interior.
- Be achievable within 12 months.
- Be sustainable, under local control, beyond 12 months.
- Have aim of police primacy on public order, criminal investigation and internal security.
- Multinational assistance and support be civilian police led and co-ordinated.
- Be Measurable

### **Strategic Drivers**

- Training.
- Equipment.
- Finance.

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### Strategic Priorities


Five priority areas to be addressed in the next 12 months.

- **Training:** Basic, Leadership and Developmental areas to be prioritised. Courses and regional, provincial or local training arranged.
- **Police Support Infrastructure:** at Police Headquarters level - Human Resources; Finance (and Contracts), Communications, Logistics.
- **Intelligence Capability:** The Collection, Collation, Analysis, Action and Dissemination of Intelligence - criminal, terrorist and counter-insurgency.
- **Operational Capability:** Police to have effective Command and Control Systems with aim of Policy Primacy; Co-Ordination; Specialist Support (SWAT and TSU); Criminal Investigation (inc. Forensic).
- **Public Support:** Development of Police interaction with the Criminal Justice System (Courts, Prisons etc), Media and Public; Development of Public and Civil Accountability; Ability to remove corrupt and inefficient police officers through a robust, transparent and accountable Complaints System (Professional Standards).

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## CIVPOL/ARMOR GROUP/CPATT ORGANISATIONAL CHART APRIL 2005



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Resources - IraqIraq

Post	Name	Rank	End of Mission Date	Comments
Chief Police Advisor-Iraq	Colin Smith	DCC	15/01/06	
Staff Officer to CPA-I		C/Insp	25/10/05	

Baghdad

Deputy Chief Police Advisor - Iraq [oversee Crime & Forensic]	Vacant	D/C/Supt.		
Advisor on Strategic Policy & Structure	vacant	Senior Civilian		(b) New Post - to be filled asap. Terms of reference agreed.
Support Team Manager		Insp.	01/09/05	
Project Leader - Crime & Forensics		Supt (Canada)	10/01/06	

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Intelligence

Project Leader - Intelligence		Intelligence Officer	June 05 (may extend)	D/C/Supt or Civ. Equivalent, (b) to be replaced by	(separate post?)
Intelligence Support (Crime Manager)		Insp.	Nov 05		
Intelligence Support (Intelligence Advisor)		Sergeant	Nov 05		
Intelligence Support	vacant	NCIS /		(d) New Post - 2 X staff to be identified and appointed asap	
Intelligence Support	vacant	NCIS /		New Post.	
TIPs Team Leader		D/Sgt.	30/11/05		
TIPs Team		PC	07/06/05	Awaiting Force authority to extend	
TIPs Team		PC	02/11/05	Moving from AZ	
TIPs Team		PC	01/06/05	(e) To be extended for 6 months - see (1) (may leave mission prior to conclusion)	notes

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TIPs Team	PC	06/06/05	Extension not an option. Not being replaced.
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### Crime

Hostage & Kidnap Advisor	PC	Jun 05	(f) to replace + TIPS - extension required
Police Centre Excellence			Also 'Project Leader - Crime & Forensics'
Police Centre Excellence			(g) Post to be filled by Canadian or overseas (New Zealand, Canada etc) if possible

### Training

Deputy Director Baghdad Academy	C/Insp.	As of 28/05/05	Post holder to be Supt or C/Insp.
Baghdad Academy Training Officer	PC	05/11/05	
Baghdad Academy Training Officer	PC	05/11/05	

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Basra

Post	Name	Rank	End of Mission Date	Comments
Deputy Chief Police Advisor – Iraq	vacant	C/Supt		(h) Post to be filled asap.
Senior Police Advisor – Iraq (South)		Supt	28/11/05	Deploying 28/5/05
Senior Police Advisor to COP (Basra)		Supt	24/07/05	(i) Extend for 6 months & until retirement if C agrees.
Senior Police Advisor Iraq (Maysan)		Supt	24/07/05	
Senior Police Advisor – Iraq (Al Muthanna)		Insp.	17/06/05	(j) to move 17/6/05 to 18/9. Future replacement to be Supt.
Training Co-Ordinator		C/Insp.	18/09/05	+ 1 Armor Group support (k) To be replaced by
Projects		C/Insp.	18/09/05	(l) To be replaced by
Intelligence Project		C/Insp.	17/06/05	+ 5 Armor Group support. To be determined by events at Police Intelligence Unit Basra. Will link to Baghdad Intelligence Project.

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C/Insp.	18/09/05	
Major	June 05	(m) Post-holder to be replaced on completion of tour – Military Action.
Insp.	23/07/05	+ 1 Armor Group support (n) To be replaced as of 03/07/05 (last effective date)
Civilian	25/08/05	Renewable contract – 6 months + 5 Amor Group support
Civilian		Armor Group contract
Civillian		Armor Group contract

Police Liaison Officer to Military
Military Liaison Officer to Police
Team Support Manager
Crime & Forensic Advisor
Deputy COP Advisor (Basra)
Deputy COP Advisor (Al Muthanna)

Az Zubayr Academy

C/Insp.	2/12/05	
Civilian	30/11/05	

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Trainers:		Sgt	18/06/05	(o) being replaced by
		Sgt	17/06/05	(p) being replaced by
		PC	16/06/05	(q) being replaced by
		PC	30/11/05	
		PC	01/06/05	(r) awaiting Force authority to extend
		PC	29/05/05	(s) being replaced by
		Sgt	07/06/05	(t) being replaced by
		Ret'd	30/11/05	
		PC	01/08/05	
		DC	07/06/05	(u) being replaced by

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PC	29/11/05	
PC	02/12/05	
PC	21/05/05	(v) being replaced by
PC	01/06/05	(w) being replaced by
PC	??	
PC	05/11/05	
PC	05/11/05	
PC	04/11/05	
PC	TBC	


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## Iraqi Police Service – Development Strategy and Plan

1. Subject to a 'Health Warning', I enclose a very early working draft, and associated papers, of the above documents. I go on R&R, Court and ACPO CT work in UK late tomorrow night and am keen to progress (and get early feedback)
2. This is still a draft document, more bullet point, less prose than the finished version (I still intend to keep final Strategy to less than 3 pages – I am a police officer not an author).
3. Whilst it has agreement of Chief of Police Basra, UK Military at Division and Brigade and local CPATTs, it is still subject to wider further consultation.
4. This is a Development Strategy and Plan **not** an IPS Policing Plan. There is a need for a national Iraqi Policing Plan, which will drive local Policing Plans from above, and widespread consultation of all stakeholders and community which will drive from below. Neither currently exist although I know the good work and his team are doing in Baghdad will soon rectify the first. Political developments (ie local governance) will drive the opportunity for the latter, though I do not expect this to be for some months.
5. In the meantime I need something to both develop the IPS locally and give something for all agencies involved to 'hang on', have ownership and above all use to co-ordinate their substantial resources and effort.
6. The key criteria are, as raised by me in recent weeks– Iraqi 'buy in', achievable within 12 months, sustainable under local control beyond 12 months, co-ordinated. If the work we undertake with our Iraqi colleagues does not meet these criteria it may be wasted effort.
7. The key drivers are – Training, Finance and Equipment. This is what the Iraqi's want (sometimes unfairly referred to as their 'shopping list' – would we in their circumstances be any different?). It is our main tool in achieving the type of change we want to see. Some of this finance, and certainly that which will sustain much of the work beyond 12 months, will have to be sought from the Ministry of the Interior.
8. There are 5 Key Priorities identified – Training, Intelligence Capability, Operational Capability, Police Support Infrastructure and Public Support. Nothing new. Some important areas, particularly Intelligence. We have not been successful in the latter. This is a key requirement for any police force in the world. There is a danger that the Iraqi's themselves are filling the vacuum with a return to the 'old ways'. We must offer alternatives and quickly. I do not believe we can 'wash our hands' on this and walk away.

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9. With the possible exception of 'Intelligence' I do not intend to concentrate on 'structures' within the IPS rather broader, generic operational capabilities which will both survive long term political change and short term uncertainty.
10. A critic has described the strategy as a 'plan to plan'. I would, and you may, concur with this. The priority (and most difficult part) is going to be translating this strategy into a 12 Month costed, and measurable Development Plan. Essential requirements are a current baseline against Key Priorities, identifying Key Goals and Targets, Action Plans and 3, 6 and 9 month Milestones. Work is underway and I hope to have a nearly finished plan on return from UK at end of April.
11. This is a considerable task for some of my officers, none of whom have undertaken anything remotely as complex as this. I am grateful for assistance offered by military colleagues who are generally much better planners than the police.
12. Like the Strategy, any plan must be short, focused and have 'punch'. A lot of the work is already underway under the successful military Security Sector Reform (SSR). I do not intend to reinvent the wheel rather try to co-ordinate future work. Outside of the military I have found co-ordination to have been generally lacking in many areas.
13. The Development Plan must be measurable and costed. Firstly so we know where we are and secondly so a comprehensive spend can be assessed, prioritised and funding opportunities identified. Again this is not going to be easy.
14. This work will identify the requirements for both AZ and Armor Group in the next 12 months. I will feed an early assessment into the GCPP Review during my meeting in London on 12 April with Joelle Jenny and team.
15. I hope this is useful. If you have any comments or suggestions – good or bad – please let me know.

Colin FW Smith  
Deputy Chief Constable  
Chief Police Advisor Iraq (South)

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