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COS (via COSSEC)

OP TELIC - SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN MND(SE)

ISSUE

1. The Plan to deliver Security Sector Reform (SSR) in MND(SE).

TIMING

2. Priority. The MND(SE) SSR Plan, reinforced by the next Force Level Review, which reports to COS on 20 Apr 05, will underpin MND(SE)'s approach through Op TELIC 6 (May-Nov 05) and Op TELIC 7 (Nov 05-May 06) and drive the rate of progress towards hand-off to an Iraqi provincial¹ security capability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. COS should note that:
 - a. The impetus behind SSR is growing. This is key to Iraqi self-reliance and Coalition disengagement from Iraq.
 - b. The conditions in MND(SE) allow the military aspects of SSR to be accelerated by diverting effort from framework security operations.
 - c. HQ MND(SE) is developing a comprehensive SSR Plan that will deliver an Iraqi provincial security capability, by focussing on a more concentrated interface with the Iraqi Army (IA).
 - d. Military support to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) will continue, but further impetus is required from other agencies. The IPU is increasing the police staff horsepower in theatre, while DfID is leading a project to support the MOI, but there is an urgent need for greater impetus in the MOI to develop an appropriate model for the Iraqi police.
 - e. We need to encourage DfID and the IPU to pick up the pace of delivery of reconstruction and governance in the South. The Cabinet Office 'task-matrix tracker' should provide a useful mechanism for co-ordinating and directing the efforts of departments in Whitehall.

¹ The term 'Provincial security capability' is used in this paper in preference to the MNF-I term 'Provincial Control'. The MNF-I definition of Provincial Control (sometimes erroneously referred to as Regional Control) is as follows: 'The conditions whereby Iraqi security organisations maintain security with Coalition support in extremis. ISF plan, direct and conduct security operations, and assume responsibility for training, sustaining and conducting personnel administration functions at battalion/provincial level. Coalition forces are postured for regional reinforcement, as well as being prepared to meet external threats. Concurrently the Iraqi Armed Forces begin to develop the capability to plan nationally, and to direct and execute defensive operations against external threats.'

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f. A plan is being developed to re-focus financial resources to SSR, whilst retaining the flexibility to maintain consent across MND(SE). The intention is to align this plan as closely as possible with the financial plans of OGDs, the US and MND(SE) Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).

4. COS are also requested to note that:

a. In line with MNF-I's *Strategy for 2005 – the Way Ahead*, MND(SE) is further re-balancing its effort, resources and forces from framework security operations to the development of effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), fit for hand-off.

b. MND(SE) is focusing primarily on the development of key military components of the military aspects of SSR, specifically 10 Div of the IA, C4I and logistics. This will be achieved through the following main mechanisms:

(1) Military Transition Teams (MTTs²) for HQ 10 Div and the brigade HQs and some logistic units in MND(SE).

(2) The Regional Training Centre (RTC) at Tallil.

(3) Specialist Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) identified now from organisations in UK to provide bespoke specialist courses, to be called forward when required by theatre.

BACKGROUND

5. Introduction. HQ MND(SE) is refining its SSR Plan to develop the ISF within MND(SE). This includes an examination of support to the IPS and synchronisation of the Security Line of Operation (LOO) with the other LOOs. This paper updates COS on this work and provides an indication of when hand-off to the ISF could occur.³

MNF-I STRATEGY – TRANSITION TO IRAQI SELF-RELIANCE

6. MNF-I Shift to SSR. To bolster Iraqi self-reliance, the main effort of MNF-I's strategy⁴ is shifting from counter-insurgency to SSR, resulting in a significant uplift in SSR-related policy and direction. The Iraqi Assistance Group (Provisional) (IAG(P)) will implement the MTT and Police Partnering Programme (P3) concepts⁵, in conjunction with the Iraqis who now have responsibility for national security and policy. The new strategy, which will be subject to a revised MOU between MNF-I and the Iraqi MOD, was briefed to the Coalition at Bucharest in late February. It was then unveiled in Baghdad on 1 Mar 05, when the Iraqi and MNF divisional commanders discussed the implementation of the new partnering arrangements between the ISF and the Coalition. This shift in strategy is included in MND(SE)'s developing SSR Plan. The new partnership arrangements will involve a three-phase plan (there are no timelines assigned to these phases as a conditions based model is more appropriate), which involves a progressive hand-off from the Coalition to the ISF during 2005 and beyond. The aim is to pave the way for eventual MNF-I drawdown, by developing the ISF's ability to conduct independent operations:

² Formerly Military Assistance Teams (MATs).

³ Requested by CDS at Op COS Meeting 10/05 on 23 Feb 05. The data is contained in the body of this Paper and at Annex A.

⁴ *Strategy for 2005 – The Way Ahead*.

⁵ The IAG(P) will be commanded by a US 1 Star and will come under command of MNC-I, with the longer-term aim of becoming the focus for all ISF assistance.

- a. Phase 1. Iraqi brigade HQs commanding Iraqi battalions.
- b. Phase 2. Iraqi brigades capable of conducting independent operations⁶ under the control of Coalition divisions.
- c. Phase 3. Iraqi divisions capable of independent operations under the command of the Iraqi Army HQ and under the overall direction of the Iraqi JHQ.

MND(SE) SSR PLAN

- 7. ISF Capacity. There is a need to delineate the Internal Security (IS) responsibilities of the IA and the IPS as this influences the military approach to SSR. MOD/MOI agreement on this issue is unlikely in the short to medium-term, although both appear to envisage a two-tier structure with local, provincially-based forces (Tier 1), backed up by more capable, mobile forces deployable pan-Iraq (Tier 2). Policy from Baghdad forecasts that the existing 10 Div of the IA will be structured as a provincial Tier 1 IS formation, expanding to 4 (currently 1) brigades and 10 (currently 6) battalions over the next 9 months. The divisional units are well manned numerically, and training has been good enough for company level operations without supervision. Equipment is coming on line, but C4I, surveillance, reconnaissance and sustainability are lacking. Details of the IA capability in MND(SE) are outlined at Annex A.
- 8. MND(SE) SSR Plan. Developing a refined MND(SE) SSR Plan is essential to setting the conditions for hand-off, drawdown and eventual withdrawal of UK troops, both in the terms of defining the capability required of the IA and the associated assessment metrics. SSR has been MND(SE)'s Main Effort for several months, but the task requires further focus and resources. As detailed policy emerges from Baghdad, we should seek commonality as a general rule, while adapting guidance pragmatically to suit the situation in the South, and attracting sufficient and timely resources. Due to the lack of a common doctrinal model, the national styles of SSR will, in due course, need to be harmonised.
- 9. Military Transition Teams (MTTs). The MTT concept, which sees teams of advisors embedded into formation HQs and battalions, is widely accepted as the way forward. Partnership⁷ has worked well in MND(SE) at unit level and this will continue. GOC MND(SE)'s intent is to dedicate MTTs to HQ 10 Div, the brigade HQs and some logistic units. The size and *modus operandi* of the MTTs will be determined in the MND(SE) SSR Plan and confirmed by the Force Level Review, as will new force protection and sustainability requirements. A MTT is envisaged to be 8-10 personnel strong. The key will be to create sufficient intensity and continuity of training to drive real change and to match it with the necessary resources required for the IA to deliver real effects. The process of embedding MTTs should start by mid-May 05; at the moment, it is not envisaged that the UK MTTs will operate outside MND(SE).
- 10. Assistance from MND(SE) Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). Early engagement with the Australians and Italians indicates that they will provide manpower for MTTs in Al-Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces. Other MND(SE) TCNs are also being encouraged to switch their focus to SSR. MOD and PJHQ personnel briefed TCNs on 8 Mar 05 and the change of emphasis was understood and welcomed. TCNs will be further engaged at an

⁶ Which could be joint with the IPS.

⁷ Informal affiliations between Coalition battlegroups and sister Iraqi units, involving training and mentoring as the security situation allows. Partnership implies a dual role: framework security operations and support to SSR. In contrast, MTT personnel have only one task - that of SSR.

Iraqi Partners Group Meeting and a Force Re-balancing Conference in May, after the next Force Level Review.

11. Short Term Training Teams (STTT). To support the MTTs, STTTs from organisations in UK will be required to deliver specialist courses in theatre. Initial work indicates that STTTs will be needed to cover Joint Planning and Incident Control, Command and Staff Training at formation level, intelligence for the PJOCs, and CSS independence. Given the force generation impact and increased pressure on the UK's own training apparatus, early work is required to identify the most appropriate mechanism for delivering the STTTs. TCNs should also be invited to sign up to the STTT approach.
12. Regional Training Centre (RTC). The RTC (formerly the Divisional Battle School) will be key to the durability of the military SSR effort in MND(SE). The Centre will host IA expansion, with the bulk of the 4 new IA battalions passing through recruit training from early August 05. Although Iraqi staff will assume growing responsibility for the RTC, a UK MTT and implementation team, commanded at OF-4 level, will be required to set up and manage the RTC establishment. The RTC is likely to be located in Tallil, which will be fit for purpose very soon. The implementation team will set up once the building work is complete; this is not likely to be before May. Over time, recruit training will be expanded to deliver wider 'land warfare centre-type' modules and there is likely to be scope to offer training for IA personnel from other MNF divisional areas.
13. Timelines. As IA capacity is built, there is potential for security responsibility to be passed on a province by province basis in accordance with the MNF-I plan. Current indications are that CG MNF-I is seeking to achieve significant force reductions, where conditions permit, towards the end of the year. GOC MND(SE)'s current view is that SSR could be completed in Al-Muthanna by Oct 05 and Maysan not before Oct 05, which would be consistent with the national plan. However, a residual MNF capability will still be required in those provinces. Dhi Qar and Basrah, sitting astride critical Main Supply Routes - with MND(SE) effectively holding the Force Rear Area - will clearly require a Coalition presence for some time after that. Potential for hand-off will also have to be gauged against the maturity of the other LOO within MND(SE).
14. Follow-up Work. Refinement of the MND(SE) SSR Plan is underway and will be underpinned by the Force Level Review. Further work is required in the following areas:
 - a. Analysis of IA Capability. There is a need to specify the IA capability, both individually and collectively, practically and doctrinally, which is to be achieved through the MTT/STTT concept. This is important work, both in terms of identifying the necessary resources and judging delivery timescales. Alignment with direction from Baghdad is important but until that materialises GOC MND(SE) has set a benchmark for the planning and execution of intelligence-led, company-level IS operations, within a battalion context, independent of MNF assistance.
 - b. Analysis of Risk. Re-balancing towards SSR will require careful assessment of where risk can be taken with framework security operations. Vulnerabilities (such as MTTs, OGD and MND(SE) locations) will require *close* protection, as well as on-going logistic and C4I support. Good intelligence and a clear understanding of the IA's *relative* strengths will be vital. We must be prepared for occasional security reverses and deploy reserves appropriately. This philosophy points to the future, when 'strategic overwatch' will require the MNF to

be able to sense danger and trigger responses, without occupying ground for its own sake.

15. Funding. GOC MND(SE) currently has delegated authority for both operational expenditure and QIPs, although the latter attract conditions which make expenditure on SSR difficult. CERP money has recently been dramatically reduced for MND(SE): as a result, a further injection of UK funding will be required. The focus of MOD expenditure in MND(SE) will increasingly be on SSR. Project OSIRIS is already delivering a range of materiel to the ISF. We need to build on this success and fill the gaps left by other programmes, including the Petraeus Plan, so that HQ MND(SE) can deliver military resources in advance of, or concurrently with, training. Without these resources, the capability we claim to create is hollow, and local confidence is undermined. The SSR Plan will define specific funding requirements. It will also be important to retain the flexibility to continue with activities, including limited-scale projects, which might be required to maintain consent. Our financial plans will also need to be as well aligned as possible with those of OGDs, the US and MND(SE) TCNs. Work is in hand on all of this issue.

POLICE REFORM

16. The comparative under-resourcing of the MOI has not helped the development of an appropriate model for Iraqi policing. The current IPS plan appears to be based on the same two-tier concept as the IA, with the IPS performing policing functions, backed up by more specialist units. Of the latter, up to two public order battalions will be based in MND(SE), which will produce an associated training responsibility. Within MND(SE), 83% of the IPS is currently recruited, of which some 60% is trained. Overall, the level of training is poor, apart from the specialist units⁶. As a consequence, the IPS is only capable of dealing with minor criminality and is vulnerable to intimidation and infiltration. The lack of national direction and policy is exacerbated at provincial level because:

a. Lines of responsibility are confused. In Baghdad and MNSTC-I, the military chain is primarily responsible for police resourcing and training policy. In MND(SE), responsibility for resourcing and mentoring is divided between the civilian CPATT advisers reporting to MNSTC-I and UK International Police Advisors (IPA) responsible to the FCO.

b. There are enduring problems with the coordination of police force generation and the management of resources. A more robust management structure is required, both to oversee the international support effort and to mentor Iraqi counterparts. The IPU is increasing police staff horsepower both in Basrah and in Baghdad to address this critical weakness.

c. The IPA efforts have had a positive local impact, but their scale is insufficient to have the desired, pervasive effect on IPS capability across the provinces.

17. Military support to the IPS in MND(SE) will continue at the tactical level in order to assist IPS development and joint operations, but more advanced training and mentoring requires specialist skills not possessed by the military. Furthermore any increase in support for the IPS would detract from the IA SSR task.

⁶ For example, the Tactical Support Units (TSUs)

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18. Fragile Infrastructure. There is a strong case for urgent enhancements to critical infrastructure, the failure of which has spawned public disorder for the past 2 summer seasons. Programmes that may be viewed by DfID as inefficient in the long term have real and immediate impact on the security environment and, ultimately, the speed with which hand-off to the ISF is possible. In this context, early improvements in electrical power generation are critical.

19. Reconstruction. The Reconstruction effort in the South leans heavily on MND(SE) support for coordination, project identification and force protection. This makes sensible use of some of the capabilities of HQ MND(SE) staff, but as hand-off to the Iraqis is achieved, reconstruction should transition fully to the civil sector (with the role of the UN and its interface with the Southern Iraq Reconstruction Coordination Group (SIRCG) clearly understood) and ultimately to Iraqi government agencies. We should plan now for how this transition will take place.

20. Synchronisation. Coordination and sequencing of elements of the UK SSR effort need improvement and proper integration within an SSR concept of operations. We need to encourage DfID and the IPU to pick up the pace of delivery of reconstruction and governance in the South. The absence of an effective mechanism to achieve synergy between the SSR and other LOOs might be remedied by the Cabinet Office's initiative to create a pan-Whitehall 'task-matrix tracker.' The output from the MND(SE) SSR Plan will be passed to the MOD Commitments Staff in order to inform Cabinet Office work.

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Annex:

A. Op TELIC – Accelerating SSR in MND(SE) – Update on the Iraqi Army (IA) Capacity in MND(SE).

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