

03 MAR 2005

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INDEX		ACTION TAKEN
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ANNEX A

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IRAQ - UK SUPPORT TO CIVIL POLICING IN IRAQ - 2005

1. This note sets out the UK's current support to civilian policing in Iraq and makes initial recommendations on what more the UK should do in 2005. The policy background is the Luck review and the agreed Iraq 2005 Strategy paper, both of which recommend a shift of MNF main effort to developing the ISF, with a particular focus on the Iraqi Police Service. The 2005 Strategy recommended that additional assistance be channelled to Baghdad.

2. UK priorities are three fold:

- Continuing support for basic IPS training in Jordan, Southern Iraq and Baghdad.
- Enhancement of IPS capability in MND(SE) through mentoring programmes to enable a reconfiguration of MNF and establishment of provincial control in the South.
- Enhancement of national capabilities, including development of a national police strategy and other national policies through deployment of senior offices to both the Ministry of Interior and MNF.

At the same time, we should seek to internationalise the effort by attracting third country assistance for programmes inside and outside Iraq, in particular for gendarmerie training, an area in which the UK has no expertise.

Iraqi Police Service Weaknesses

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3. At the national level, there is an urgent need for an Iraqi national policing strategy, supported by an appropriate training syllabus to address established weaknesses. These include poor leadership, absenteeism, politicisation, limited capabilities and a lack of appropriate weaponry (now being addressed through US/UK programmes).

4. Planned increases in the size of the IPS mean that current training and equipment programmes will need to continue into mid-2006. MNF efforts so far have focused on increasing IPS numbers through basic training courses - some 56,900 officers are now trained and equipped. These programmes need to continue in 2005, but be supplemented by efforts to develop leadership, technical capabilities, particularly intelligence, forensics, crime scene management and investigative techniques. The ITG will also need to develop an effective response to intimidation and a hard edge gendarmerie-type capability (an area in which the UK has little expertise). The incoming ITG will have views on whether a third force should be police or military.

Current UK Commitments fall into three main areas:

a. Planned Support for Basic IPS Training

- **Jordan.** 57 UK officers carrying out basic training at the Jordan International Police Training Centre. 3,000 graduates every 8 weeks. We expect this commitment to continue throughout 2005. Further internationalisation of the project could lead to a reduction in the UK contribution. **Cost:** £5 m per annum from GCPP International Peace Keeping Funding.
- **South - Training at Az-Zubayr Police Academy.** Some 23 UK civilian serving and retired police officers. This project provides both basic and

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lower level specialist training to up to 200 IPS at a time. We expect this commitment to continue throughout 2005. **Cost:** some £1.9 million p.a. funded by the GCPP International Peacekeeping Fund.

- **Baghdad Police Academy - Training.** Chief Inspector Goudie plus 5 MOD police officers. The UK contribution is the only serving civilian police component in the Academy, which produces 3,000 graduates every 8 weeks. We expect this commitment to continue throughout 2005. **Cost:** £400,000 p.a. from GCPP International Peacekeeping Funding.

b. Enhancement of Capabilities in MND SE

- **Advising and mentoring of Iraqi Provincial Chiefs of Police, and developing criminal investigation capability.** Currently six senior and middle ranking officers, now headed by DCC Colin Smith, drawn from Home Office Forces, the MOD Police and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The officers' role is to act as mentors to Iraqi Chiefs of Police and to enhance leadership. **Cost:** £500,000 from GCPP International Peacekeeping Fund. We expect this commitment to continue throughout 2005. MND(SE)
- **Specialist training and mentoring of the IPS in the southern provinces- 40 contract International Police Advisers (Phase II of the Armorgroup Contract).** GCPP (Iraq) has approved funding to increase the number of mentors by nearly 75% to allow mentoring to be undertaken in Maysan and to provide forensic expertise to support effective scenes of crime investigation capability in the South. The performance of this project will be reviewed prior to any further extension into 2006. **Cost:** £4.8 million for six months.

c. Enhancement of National Capabilities

- **Senior Civilian Police Adviser (Robert Davies)** reporting to **Minister of the Interior**. He is supported by 12 officers in advisory roles. To contribute towards Iraqi development of a national police strategy we need traction both with officials in the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and US authorities. The latter aspect has been particularly difficult in the civil-military fora. **Cost:** £500,000 from GCPP International Peace Keeping Funding.

New Priorities Arising from the Iraq 2005 Strategy Paper for which Funding Has Not Yet Been Agreed.

5. **Development of National Strategies.** The Iraq 2005 paper identified new priorities as developing Ministry of Interior capabilities and influencing the development of national policing strategies in key areas. To achieve these aims would require at least three additional senior UK police officers on 6-month – 1-year contracts (at an average cost of £120,000 per annum for each officer, assuming serving officers can be found) working in some of the following areas:

- A project manager for forensics to establish forensic policy. Forensics is an essential component to investigating crime and insurgent attacks and is linked to second post for Crime Manager to establish a criminal investigation policy and procedures.
- Personnel to work in the MOI to develop the intelligence system.
- Strategic planner and mentor to develop the National Police Plan. This work will need to be linked to the DfID-led MOI support programme as well as working closely with MNSTC-I. This will be further linked to a

planned IPS Commanders Planning Course to enhancing IPS command functions.

Estimated Total Cost: ~~£~~360,000/Funding to come from Iraq GCPP. Not yet agreed.

6. **Development of Iraqi Intelligence Capability** (once the new Government's intentions are clear) **with an emphasis on counter-insurgency operations, drawing in Northern Ireland/Special Branch experience.** This will require UK civil police engagement in CPATT. An immediate requirement ~~is~~ for a senior PSNI officer on a short-term deployment. **Estimated Cost:** ~~£~~15,000,

7. Developing a Special Branch capability within the IPS remains a UK priority. The Metropolitan Police are currently refusing to deploy staff to Baghdad on security grounds. We are approaching Sir Ian Blair to see if he will take a different approach. If not, we will need to look at alternatives like recruiting PSNI or contract officers with relevant experience. Costs will fall to the GCPP peacekeeping strategy and will depend on the extent UK engagement.

Other Possible Commitments

8. With the withdrawal of Dutch forces from Al Muthanna in March, there will be a need to take on the civilian police mentoring role which the Dutch have been playing, to complement the military mentoring role UK forces will be playing. One option would be to extend the Armorgroup contract to include Al-Muthanna as well. An initial contract until August 05 would cost an estimated £1.25 million from GCPP. We are lobbying the Dutch and Japanese to see whether they are prepared to fund this, or whether UN or WB funds could be used. But if not, we may need to fund this ourselves.

11. The MNF-I proposed Police Assistance teams now seem unlikely to get off the ground.

Constraints

12. **Staffing Levels in Baghdad.** Security will continue to constrain the number of SSR staff we can deploy to Baghdad. Their importance will have to be weighed against other HMG priorities. Much useful work can be done by staff confined to the International Zone, but access to the Ministry of the Interior can be difficult.
13. **Recruiting.** Senior serving policemen are difficult to recruit. Home forces are reluctant to release them for a variety of reasons - principally security, but also because deployment overseas does not fit into longer term career structures. Contractors can fill the gap, but they are more expensive.
14. **Security.** The security situation constrains some activities and increases costs significantly. We will need to look carefully at security rules to see how these apply to mentoring, where greater freedom of movement is required.
15. **Iraqi Government.** The ITG will bring in new Ministers, with their own views on the way ahead. There will be disruption of existing plans.

Resource Implications

16. Funding for UK policing assistance comes from two main streams:
 - the GCPP (International Peacekeeping Fund) - which has committed to spend £8.6m in Iraq and Jordan in 2005
 - GCPP (Iraq Fund).

The former is stretched, and while it can cover existing commitments may not be able to meet new ones. New funding, therefore, will fall to GCPP Iraq.

17. In overall terms Iraq (all activity not just SSR), is receiving from the GCPP some £8.6 million from the peacekeeping segment and a further £13.5 million direct to the Iraq GCPP strategy. This totals £22.1 million for 2005/6, and is approximately 30% of the entire GCPP fund (£74 million).

18. Of the £13.5 million GCPP (Iraq) funds for 2005/06, the GCPP (Iraq) Committee have so far committed £9.3 million. Of this SSR expenditure will amount to £5.5 million, which equates to 41% of the overall fund, and encompasses the prison and policing projects. Outside SSR there is a separate project to support the Ministry of Interior valued at £2.57 million and some £950,000 for Human Rights, see Annex B for a more detailed breakdown.

19. There is, therefore, no immediate shortage of GCPP Iraq funds – funding is available for all planned police activity for the next six months. However, if were to renew the Armor Group contract for another six months (£4.8) million, this would lead to an overspend. Extending the Armor Group contract to Al-Muthanna (estimated cost £1.25 million) would increase the potential overspend.

20. This would also leave no GCPP money for renewing other important contracts, like Phase III of the Prison Mentoring Contract, or for new projects in other areas which GCPP Iraq is likely to be the prime source of funds for e.g. human rights/mass graves; additional support for the Iraqi Special Tribunal; support for development of the media; plus possible new commitments arising from the constitutional process (e.g. Kirkuk).

FCO 21 February 2005