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D/PJHQ/300/19/5/5

11 Feb 05

PSO/CDS

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OP TELIC: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

ISSUE

1. MNF-I is shifting its Main Effort from conducting COIN operations to building the capability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to conduct independent COIN operations. This new strategy has been termed 'Transition to Self-Reliance'. As outlined in my note to DCDS(C)¹, we now need to decide how this piece sits within the wider Cabinet Office sponsored work, and then work with MND(SE) to turn this strategy into a plan.

RECOMMENDATION

2. CDS is requested to note that:

- a. MNF-I's new strategy involves a switch in Main Effort from COIN operations to building ISF capability, primarily based on the provision of assistance teams. This strategy has not yet been endorsed by POTUS.
- b. MND(SE) has been conducting limited Security Sector Reform (SSR) for some time, based on in-place forces partnering local ISF units. UK's scope to progress this work will be constrained by available resources², and our success in handing off security tasks to ISF.
- c. MND(SE) is currently considering 2 options for the implementation of the MNF-I proposal:
 - Option 1: Full Support. Military assistance teams (MATs) placed with every ISF unit in MND(SE), including the Army, Border Force, Special Police and at training schools (the MNF-I default).

¹ PJHQ/J5/12/0708/02/08 dated 8 Feb 05 - Iraq: Maintaining the Momentum Post Elections in MND(SE).

² UK's assumption of Al Muthanna with a battlegroup reduces MND(SE)'s SSR capacity now, but may provide an opportunity if Al Muthanna could be handed off to ISF within the next 6 months.

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- **Option 2: Targeted Support.** Continuation of current partnering arrangements with ISF units, but providing assistance teams for areas of weakness, such as formation headquarters, training schools and logistic bases.
- d. Resource implications of the 2 options will be assessed by a JFHQ Operational Liaison and Recce Team (OLRT), deploying to theatre next week. It is intended that the OLRT will include a police adviser to enable a detailed consideration of the IPS development requirements. To further aid the coherency of this SSR work, the Team will be assisted by a member of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).
- e. The potential exists for UK to offer additional SSR assistance by augmenting intelligence assistance teams, offering spare training capacity to MND(CS) and increasing Iraqi attendance on UK courses.
- f. There are a number of unresolved issues including the level of Iraqi political and military support for the new MNF-I strategy, coalition partners' involvement in planning, the train-operate-train concept, the degree of additional risk and the whole issue of SSR for the IPS.
- g. SSR for the IPS is probably the most important line of operation. MOD does not have the lead, but we should nevertheless look to focus and coordinate the efforts of others, concentrating on organisational development in Baghdad and mentoring at provincial and district levels.

TIMING

3. Routine. To inform CDS prior to his visit to Washington on 15 Feb 05.

BACKGROUND

4. In Jan 05 HQ USCENTCOM issued a PLANORD for Military and Police Assistance CONOPS as part of the Strategic Campaign Plan for 2005. The MNF-I plan directed a shift in emphasis from delivering security in partnership with the ISF to developing a self-reliant ISF. MNF-I is planning for a transition of responsibility for COIN operations from MNF to capable ISF, whilst the MNF assume a less visible presence. Concurrently, MNF will develop ISF capabilities through the partnering of Iraqi and Coalition units and the direct support of assistance teams³, embedded at all levels within Iraqi Army and Police units. This plan has not yet been endorsed by POTUS.
5. MNF-I intends to create assistance teams that are permanently embedded in every Iraqi unit. It is understood that there will be a total requirement of 269 US assistance

³. There are a variety of assistance teams being proposed: Military Assistance Team (MAT), Police Assistance Team (PAT), Special Police Assistance Team (SPAT), Border Assistance Team (BAT) and Intelligence Assistance Team (IAT).

teams across Iraq, amounting to a US manpower bill of some 3100 personnel⁴. About half of this manpower will be found by re-tasking existing in-theatre resources; the remainder are likely to be augmentees. The command structure of an entire US-based division will be stripped out to provide this additional manpower.

6. Originally, MNF-I proposed assistance teams for the IPS (PATs). Senior Iraqi politicians did not support this concept and it is now unlikely to be implemented in full. However, a pilot scheme, covering some 38 police stations in the Baghdad area, is still planned. IPS development is hampered by the lack of a coherent vision of the nature and future structure of the IPS.

UK OPTIONS

7. Current UK Assistance to SSR. At divisional level, SSR is conducted differently across Iraq, although the overall effect has been broadly similar. To date, UK assistance has been limited to training and mentoring the ISF according to geographical location, dictated by operational tempo. The emphasis has been on partnering and there are currently no UK personnel embedded within Iraqi units. Where a deteriorating security environment has prevented SSR activity, the operational effectiveness of the nascent Iraqi organisations has declined rapidly.

8. Future UK Commitment to SSR. MNF-I has assumed that MND(SE) will provide all of the necessary manpower and resources required to support the new SSR strategy within its AO. Given MOD guidance to avoid a significant increase in commitment, our scope to implement this SSR strategy will be constrained by our ability to free up and refocus manpower. MND(SE) is currently considering two options, which require different levels of commitment and resources:

a. Option 1: Full Support. In Option 1, the UK fully supports the US concept, matching the US proposed distribution of assistance teams.⁵ In MND(SE), this requirement would amount to 25 teams, totalling some 324 personnel. This figure does not include manpower for force protection, life support or interpreters. A proposed breakdown for this option is at Annex A.

b. Option 2: Targeted Support. In Option 2, MND(SE) follows the spirit of the US concept, but implements in a less manpower intensive manner. Partnership (rather than embedding) at battalion level and below would continue as now, but assistance teams would target specific areas of assessed ISF weakness:

- C4I. A short term training team (STTT) would deliver a short, intensive command and staff training package to brigade and divisional staff. Assistance teams would then be embedded into brigade and divisional headquarters.

⁴. This figure only covers the assistance teams for the Army, Special Police and the Border Force, as well as some specialist teams (such as intelligence). The US also plan to dedicate one battalion per brigade to SSR, giving an estimated US total manpower commitment to SSR of around 15,000 personnel.

⁵. All US teams will probably consist of 10 personnel. It is likely that UK teams will vary in size and composition dependent on the unit that they are assisting.

- Training Base. MND(SE) would establish an Iraqi-led Divisional Battle School for Iraqi units within the MND(SE) AO. This establishment would then provide a long term training base.
- Sustainment. There is currently no recognisable CSS capability within the ISF. Two Base Support Units (BSUs) are planned for the MND(SE) AO and specialist assistance teams would be allocated to each BSU.

Most of these teams would 'commute' between the Iraqi base and the nearest Coalition location. Assistance teams would not be provided to Army battalions, Border Force units or Public Order battalions. The anticipated manpower bill for MND(SE) is at Annex B.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

9. Detailed staff work is in progress but Option 1 would probably need to be based on a battalion-sized unit. This would need to be dedicated solely to SSR and could provide much of the necessary manpower and rank structure for the assistance teams. It would also have the necessary force protection, vehicles and communications. Option 2 would result in a smaller manpower bill, although MND(SE) would have to source force protection, vehicles and communications. Both options will require further augmentation by personnel from the UK with particular skills (e.g. staff trained officers, logisticians). To support HQ MND(SE)'s detailed planning a JFHQ OLRT will deploy to theatre next week. Ideally, we must have the chosen option resourced in time for the next UK brigade rotation in April 05. This would also meet the US projected time line for implementation of the strategy.

10. Coalition Partners. Coalition partners in MND(SE) have not yet been approached but they could pick up a significant part of the manpower bill. If each nation provided for those units within their own AO, UK would not have to provide 3 of the 4 brigade teams or 8 of the 10 battalion teams.

11. Force Protection and Interpreters. Up to two platoons would be required to provide force protection for each assistance team, dependent on location. This could require the diversion of up to 500 personnel for Option 1, although MND(SE) partners would be expected to provide force protection for their own teams. In addition, reliable and impartial interpreters will be essential to the success of this concept and initial calculations indicate that around 100 interpreters would be required across the MND(SE) AO for Option 1. The provision of locally employed interpreters is likely to present both sourcing and funding challenges.⁶

POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL UK ASSISTANCE

12. Areas where the UK may be able to provide additional SSR support are:

⁶. At current rates, an interpreter is paid \$300 a month.

- a. Intelligence Assistance Teams (IATs). IATs are being established at the Baghdad headquarters of the MOD and MOI. Selected UK personnel⁷ able to operate at the strategic/national level could have a highly beneficial effect as members of these teams. Initial indications are that the US would welcome any UK offer to contribute to these IATs.
- b. Assistance to MND(CS) and Iraq-wide. MND(CS) nations are thought unlikely to support the new MNF-I strategy, both for political and military reasons. The US is planning to provide all the teams for this AO and for the first 6 months provide partnering teams at company level. The UK might consider offering spare training capacity (such as staff training, courses at the Divisional Battle School or logistic training), to ISF units located within MND(CS) or elsewhere in Iraq. Under current constraints, such training would have to be conducted within MND(SE).
- c. Training of ISF Personnel in UK. There may be scope for expanding the number of Iraqi military personnel attending courses in the UK.
- d. Iraqi Air Force. Further training assistance to the Iraqi Air Force, most of which is currently based at Basrah, could be conducted.

Although outside the scope of this new US strategy, it should be noted that the UK is already providing a Naval Assistance Team of around 50 personnel at Umm Qasr. This has been reconfigured to better deliver the full spectrum of maritime training to the developing Iraqi Navy. The UK has also deployed 11 personnel as instructors at the Iraqi Military Academy al-Rustimiyah (IMAAR) situated on the outskirts of Baghdad. Additionally, a further 11 personnel are due to deploy to Baghdad in early March as part of the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I).

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

13. Iraqi Buy-In. Without the full commitment of the Iraqi political and military leadership, the MAT proposal is unlikely to succeed. The PATs concept has already been restricted to a pilot scheme. In MND(SE), it is essential that the Commander of the 10th Division supports the proposal since he commands most of the ISF in the MND(SE) AO. We also need a clearer understanding of the Iraqi vision for their Armed Forces. As the Iraqi MOD increasingly takes control, new units are being formed or re-roled and proposed unit locations being changed.

14. MND(SE) Coalition Partners. The US has not yet briefed Coalition partners in detail on the 'Transition to Self Reliance' concept, and it is understood that they intend to do this at the Bucharest Conference 22-24 Feb 05. Within MND(SE), it is anticipated that significant contributions may be provided by our Coalition partners.

15. Train-Operate-Train Concept. An essential aspect of the proposed US concept is that the embedded teams would accompany their Iraqi unit on operations. Given current

⁷ Preferably senior staff from other government agencies rather than military personnel. Junior military analysts would not be suitable, neither have we spare capacity.

political constraints outlined in the Interim Strategic Direction⁸, this is likely to become an issue if the unit was deployed outside the MND(SE) AO. This problem would also be faced by our Coalition partners in MND(SE). Whilst there are currently no plans for the Iraqi 10th Division to deploy outside its local area, this may change. The two Public Order battalions in Basrah could be deployed anywhere in Iraq. Even when deployed within the MND(SE) AO, issues may still arise with Rules of Engagement (ROE) when embedded teams are deployed on operations with their Iraqi unit.

16. Risk. The MATs concept may involve some increased risk. Detailed risk assessments will be conducted for each Iraqi unit location but, even with integral force protection, the risk to permanently embedded teams at some locations may prove to be unacceptable. Regular commuting to Iraqi unit locations by non-embedded personnel would also involve some additional risk.

17. SSR for the Iraqi Police Service. The IPS is central to SSR and yet the PATs concept is unlikely to progress further in its current form. Although MOD does not have the lead in IPS SSR, the military should still look at what assistance it can provide to improve the overall operational effectiveness of the IPS. There is a lack of clear direction from Baghdad as to the future shape and structure of the IPS. To date, HQ MND(SE) has been limited to acting in support of the International Police Advisors⁹, as well as providing RMP advice at the tactical level. The OLRT will assist in scoping the level and feasibility of providing further advice and mentorship to the IPS on security, intelligence, communications and basic police functions within a COIN environment. Emerging MNF-I proposals see PATs operating from MOI level (requiring senior Police Advisors in Baghdad and Basrah) down to a certain level of IPS commander, probably district/city chief. There are undoubtedly opportunities for UK to use the expertise of other TCNs within MND(SE) (e.g. Italy, Czech Republic) to assist in the provision of SSR to the IPS. We hope that the OLRT will include a police adviser from the Home Office so that the Team can consider a more coherent approach to improving IPS capability. In addition, the Team will be assisted by a member of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).

18. Way Ahead. MNF-I will formally present their proposed concept at the Bucharest Conference 22-24 Feb 05. This will provide further clarity, thereby allowing UK to refine its potential contribution. The proposed US timeline sees the teams established by May 05; this coincides with the next planned UK brigade roulement. However, decisions must be made before this in order to enable the necessary planning and preparation to take place, including the force generation of specialist training personnel. The US planning assumption is that the teams will be required for 2 years, although some Iraqi units (including those in MND(SE)) are likely to be ready earlier¹⁰.

Signed on CHoTs

⁸. DCts(Ops) (027-05) dated 8 Feb 05: Iraq 2005 – Interim Strategic Direction for PJHQ.

⁹. There are currently 43 UK civilian police officers in Iraq and 40 private contractors (increasing to 68 in Mar 05). The majority of civilian police are involved in training at the police academies, their mentoring ability being restricted by security concerns and restrictions placed by ACPO.

¹⁰. According to the MNF-I Campaign Plan, Provincial Control is to be achieved in the South by Jul 05, although it could occur earlier in al-Muthanna and Dhi Qar.

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Annexes:

- A. Proposed Breakdown of Assistance Teams in MND(SE): Option 1 – Full Support.
- B. Proposed Breakdown of Assistance Teams in MND(SE): Option 2 – Targeted Support

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ANNEX A TO
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**PROPOSED BREAKDOWN OF ASSISTANCE TEAMS IN MND(SE):
OPTION 1 - FULL SUPPORT**

| Ser | Req Unit | Advisors | Sp Pers | Total Teams | Total Personnel | Remarks |
|-----|---|---|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|---|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (f) | (g) | (h) |
| 1 | 10 Div HQ (Basrah) | 1 x Brig/Col 1 x Lt Col 4 x Maj | 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x OR | 1 | 13 | UK |
| 2 | Bde HQ (71,72,73,74 Bdes) | 1 x Lt Col 4 x Maj | 1 x SNCO 3 x OR | 4 | 36 | 3 teams may be filled by Coalition TCNs (27 personnel). |
| 3 | Bn HQ (601 to 610 Bns) | 1 x Maj 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x Lt/SNCO | 1 x SNCO 9 x OR | 10 | 180 | 8 teams may be filled by Coalition TCNs (144 personnel). Four of these Bns have yet to be formed. |
| 4 | Div Battle School (Tallil) | 1 x Maj 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x Lt/SNCO | 1 x SNCO 9 x OR | 1 | 18 | UK Short Term Training Team (STTT) initially? |
| 5 | Base Support Units (Basrah and Tallil- TBC) | 1 x Maj 4 x Capt | 1 x SNCO 3 x OR | 2 | 18 | CSS Concept yet to be established. |
| 6 | Public Order Bn (Special Police) (Basrah with 2 nd Bn TBC) | 1 x Maj 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x Lt/SNCO | 1 x SNCO 9 x OR | 2 | 36 | Deployable Nationally. Only one Bn exists at present but a second is planned. |
| 7 | Border Force Region HQs (Muthana, Maysan and Basra) | 1 x SNCO | 1 x Sig 1 x Medic 1 x Dvr | 3 | 12 | Regional Border Force HQ are equivalent to Bn HQs. |
| 8 | Border Force Academy | 1 x WO 1 x SNCO | 1 x Medic 1 x Dvr | 1 | 4 | Monitoring training standards. |
| 9 | Border Force Mobile Team | 1 x Maj 1 x WO | 1 x SNCO 2 x Sig 2 x Dvr | 1 | 7 | Mobile Team covering all Border Forces in MND(SE) AO. |
| | | | TOTAL | 25 | 324 | |

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PROPOSED BREAKDOWN OF ASSISTANCE TEAMS IN MND(SE):
OPTION 2 – TARGETED SUPPORT

| Ser | Unit/Unit | Advisors | Sp/Para | Total Teams | Total Personnel | Remarks |
|-----|--|---|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|---|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 1 | 10 Div HQ (Basrah) | 1 x Brig/Col 1 x Lt Col 4 x Maj | 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x OR | 1 | 13 | UK |
| 2 | Bde HQ (71,72,73,74 Bdes) | 1 x Lt Col 4 x Maj | 1 x SNCO 3 x OR | 4 | 36 | 3 teams may be filled by Coalition TCNs (27 personnel). |
| 3 | Div Battle School (Tallil) | 1 x Maj 1 x Capt 1 x WO2 5 x Lt/SNCO | 1 x SNCO 9 x OR | 1 | 18 | |
| 4 | Base Support Units (Basrah and Tallil- TBC) | 1 x Maj 4 x Capt | 1 x SNCO 3 x OR | 2 | 18 | CSS Concept yet to be established. |
| 5 | Short Term Training Team (STTT) | 20 total (ranks tbc) | 5 total (ranks tbc) | 1 | 25 | Courses cover SO2 to Div Comd. Likely to be 6 weeks in duration. |
| | | | TOTAL | 9 | 110 | |

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