

2 JAN 2005

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**Iraq Security Assessment Team**

**(Report of DCC Colin FW Smith)**

1. Shortly before Christmas 2004 I was invited by the Foreign and Commonwealth to join, and assist, a US led Iraq Security Assessment Team (ISAT) that was planning to visit Iraq in early January 2005.
2. Accompanied by [redacted], MOD, I attended an initial briefing on the 6 January 2005 at the Pentagon, Washington DC, USA.
3. The Team Leader, General (retd) Gary LUCK, appointed by the US Secretary of Defense, set out the Terms of Reference (attached Appendix 1), and introduced the other members of the team (attached Appendix 2). Key members of the Team were Lt General Raymond ODIERNO, (US Military), Lt General (retd) Carol CABIGIOSU (Italian Army) and Brig General Leonardo LESO (Italian Carabinieri).
4. Findings and feedback from the Team was to be provided verbally by Generals LUCK and ODIERNO to the Secretary of Defense. Briefing material was to be by 'Powerpoint Presentation'.
5. The ISAT assembled at Qatar over 11/12 January and moved to Baghdad on the 13 January.
6. Between 13 January and 19 January ISAT received a number of briefings from Senior Multi National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) officers and Agencies. Members of the team met individually in groups with other key stakeholders, including senior Iraqi Ministers.
7. I had the specific task of reviewing the current capability and future development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). In conducting this I was accompanied by Brig General Leonardo LESO. In carrying out this task I met with the Iraqi Ministers of Interior, Falah Al Naqib and Defence, Hazim Sha'alan and General ADNAN, Head of Special Police Commando Battalions. In addition to the above I travelled to Basrah on 17 January and spoke with General RILEY, Consul Simon COLLIS and General HASSAN, Chief of Police, Basrah.
8. I made regular inputs into Gen LUCK. Whilst Brig General LESO did separately, our findings were broadly in agreement.
9. At the conclusion of our visit, and prior to [redacted] and myself departing for Kuwait on 20 January, I left an 'unproofed' copy of my report with Gen LUCK. A copy was also left with the British Embassy, Bob Davies, Chief Police Advisor and General Kiszely. I

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have also shared this with CC Paul Kernaghan, ACPO International Affairs.

10. I attach at Appendix 3 a 'corrected' copy of my report. In view of the brief time spent both in Iraq and collecting information, this report should be seen as an oversight review, identifying key areas of concern, NOT a comprehensive assessment. It would be arrogant of me not to acknowledge that there are no 'silver bullets' in respect of the future and that many of my comments will already have been considered at much greater depth by those closely involved, in difficult circumstances, over the past 20 months
11. The key recommendation in respect of the Iraqi Police Service that ISAT will pass back to the US Secretary of Defense, relates to the concept of the Police Advisory Teams (PATs). These are intended to accelerate the capability of the IPS to operate throughout Iraq. Conceived within the upper echelons of MNF-I, particularly a number of US Generals, the idea is to provide greater operational capability particularly through better firearms training and tactics. PATs will be imbedded within Iraqi police units to a far greater degree than current International Police Advisors (IPAs).
12. The idea is not universally supported, concerns have been raised by, inter alia:
  - US advisors who are concerned about the practicality of basing officers 24/7 within Iraqi Police Stations, particularly in areas of high security risk.
  - Existing IPAs who, in addition to the additional risks, feel that the concentration on military training, by military personnel, will change the civilian direction of police training.
  - Iraqi Minister of Interior. Whilst keen to attract further weapons and training etc. there is reluctance to see greater US involvement in operational policing. It is also clear that there was no, or at best little, Iraqi involvement in the development of the concept. This has not been well received by the Iraqis. The Minister of the Interior has indicated that he will support the idea in a small number of 'difficult' areas.
13. There was some discussion between ISAT and the US Command over how the training would be co-ordinated. Whilst the latter were content for existing US battalions to provide the PATs from within their personnel, Gen LUCK favoured a more co-ordinated approach under a separate command. It was not clear which view was to be adopted.

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14. There is expected to be further development of the concept. It is likely that MNF-I will be seeking a significant increase in the number of civilian police advisors to join PATs and may turn to the international police community to respond.
15. A decision may be required as to UK participation in this area, not only in providing additional IPAs but further senior police representation. It was acknowledged by ISAT that senior police representation in the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was low.

Colin FW Smith  
Deputy Chief Constable

23 January 2005

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## Iraq Security Assessment

(Report of DCC Colin Smith)

### Terms of Reference

- 1.1 As in Gen (rtd) LUCK letter to US SecDef dated 6 January 2005:

Para 2: *'Review current programs and provide recommendations to increase the effectiveness of Iraqi Security Forces, including the types of Iraqi forces that are or may be required'*

Para 3: *'Review suggestions to accelerate and/or adjust our current strategy with regard to Iraqi Security Forces.'*

- 1.2 In respect of *'Iraqi Security Forces'* this assessment has limited itself to consideration of the nascent Iraqi Police Service and *'auxiliary bodies'*.

### Strategic Direction

- 2.1 The following are taken as *'given'*:

- a. The long term strategic aim is to create a Judicial and Policing System that is effective, efficient, credible and works with the general consent of the populace.
- b. Any Policing System must be one that is supported by the Iraqi Government and people and fits within their historic (pre Saddam Hussein) cultural traditions.
- c. That (a) and (b) above are constrained by the differing levels of counter-insurgency and terrorism that exist in some parts of the country. The priority is to establish effective military and police control over all areas of the country.

### Initial Plan

- 3.1 The original plan post May 2003 was to train and equip 75k Iraqi Police Officers, locally recruited, but forming a National Iraqi Police Service under the Minister of the Interior (MOI). This was amended on a number of occasions and in August 2004 MNSTC I established a target of 135k. Whilst these officers were issued Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), particularly handguns, their function was that understood as, with some differences in detail, a *'western (UK/US/European) policing style'*.
- 3.2 Support to the police was to be provided by units such as The National Guard under the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

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- 3.3 Training was provided In Iraq at Baghdad, Regional Centres and in Jordan.

(**Concern;** The requirement to train such a substantial number of recruits, some with no previous police experience, and the lack of qualified international police trainers has meant that much of the training has been conducted by military personnel. Most police have probably received no training).

### Current Situation

- 4.1 The increased level of insurgency, terrorism, intimidation, and assassination directed by a number of elements against police, resulting in (locally estimated) **1,300 fatalities**, has made, in some areas notably Baghdad and Western Iraq, the concept of community based policing currently unsustainable)

(**Note:** It should be noted that the levels of violence differ across the country. The security situation in the North-East and South for example allow for the continued development, with some modifications, of the community based policing style.)

- 4.2 In those areas effected by the security situation, police numbers are effected by officers going 'absent' (AWOL) for periods of time, low morale etc. There is disagreement (or lack of information) about the number of officers 'available for duty'. Local contacts indicate that for the forthcoming elections this may be as low as 40K across the country. MNFI have a reported figure of over 90K.

- 4.3 Similar problems affect the National Guard and have affected their ability to support either Coalition Forces or police.

(**Note:** It has been reported locally that MOD intention is that the National Guard is 'consolidated' into the Iraqi Army)

### Current Response

- 5.1 Policing has understandably taken a back seat in some areas whilst attempts are made to provide adequate 'military' support to the policing effort. This has focused largely on 'Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) formations'

(**Note:** The current number and training levels of the Iraqi Army do not make it currently feasible to fulfil this role. The option exists of increasing military (MNF) collocation and joint patrolling with police units (the approach adopted by the British in 1970's Northern Ireland). Whilst I doubt this would find favour on two grounds firstly, it is hugely resource intensive and secondly, where MNF are themselves a prime target, such 'low level' patrolling will undoubtedly increase casualties, it does provide a 'safe working' environment within which normal policing



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functions can be carried out. I am aware of MFNI proposals to embed MAT's/PATs in police stations. This would be a welcome response in areas of highest insurgent threat. What is the current state/location/standard of Police Stations? Are they in the right area? In areas of highest security threat is there a case for relocating to military bases? (UK Northern Ireland experience in South Armagh and West Belfast). Has there been an audit of police station requirement, state of infrastructure? Has this a high enough budgetary priority? – unless you have a safe security environment, other civil projects will not succeed.

- 5.2 The immediate response appears to have been to increase the level of 'military' capability of threatened police – issue of AK37 automatic rifles etc. – but this has not significantly increased their capability, or reduced casualties.
- 5.3 The option that has gained most support both within the Iraqi Government and MNF has been the rapid development of 'auxiliary' formations'.

(Note: I do not use the term 'paramilitary'. I think a distinction needs to be made.)

#### Auxiliary Formations

- 6.1 Post May 2003<sup>4</sup> a number of units – 'Public Order Battalions' – were raised and trained (currently 6, 3 more begin training in late January) with the remit of performing public order duties (riot control etc). These units have been refocused to provide a more military response but could provide a QRF response to attacks against Police.
- 6.2 In response to mounting attacks and murder of police, deterioration in some areas such as Fallujah and the inability of the police in some areas to perform even basic patrol duties, a number (currently "12" – General Adnan) of Police Commando Battalions have been raised within the MOI. A recent addition has been the formation of the "8<sup>th</sup> Mechanised Police Brigade" comprising 3 battalions. These latter appear to be a singularly Iraqi initiative.
- 6.3 Consensus within higher command in MNFI, despite initial reservations, is that these 'auxiliary units' are doing a good job as defined by their operational capability and work in difficult areas.

(Note: That they are doing a good job, in that they are filling a 'vacuum' which cannot currently be filled by other 'Iraqi formations' is not in contention. What is questionable is where they fit within 'policing', command and control and where in the long term they will eventually take policing – Internal Security?)

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(Concerns: Who controls these units – MNF or local Iraqi? What discipline are they subject to – police or military? Unless they are firmly imbedded in either they risk going the way of police auxiliaries ('Black and Tans') recruited in similar circumstances in Ireland in 1919 from ex-military personnel to bolster the overwhelmed Royal Irish Constabulary. Their uncontrolled actions e.g. heavy handed tactics and reprisals did much harm to police support in the community. Long term concerns about Human Rights issues that may affect community view of police in general? Need firm control and preferably deployed as paramilitary formations, supporting, but distinct from local police.

- 6.4 **Despite all the above reservations they are currently the only local Iraqi SF capable of taking on the insurgents and should be supported.** Where possible such support should allied to resolving command and control issues.

### Training

- 7.1 Training has throughout been a key issue. There are now reported to be 47k 'trained' police. Initial police training was geared at Human Rights and basic police patrolling skills. This has subsequently been supplemented with increased self protection training and equipment (at the reported cost in the reduction of some Human Rights training – appropriate balance needed?) This has however not equipped the police to deal with the threat from counter insurgency.

(Note: There appears to have been a concentration on quantity i.e. the number of officers recruited (to meet centrally set, unrealistic performance targets) rather than the quality of the officers trained. Has there been an assessment of training outcomes?

- 7.2 The quality of the Iraqi police will be crucial in the immediate future. Recent proposals to create Police Assistance Teams (PAT's) may address the post initial training, quality and morale issues.

### Leadership

- 8.1 PAT's embedded in the police may also address the key issue of leadership. Good leadership is essential where units are facing severe security issues.

(Concerns: What is the capacity (and willingness) of the International Policing Community to provide good quality trainers at not only basic but middle and higher leadership training? Will the security issues in those areas that require this training mitigate against permanent imbedding of advisors? Inherent dislike of Iraqi MOI to this – shows Iraqi cannot manage own affairs. Can PAT's develop into a true Advisory Group role to strengthen police capability and resilience? Need to implement BUT review and assess before general rollout

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## Other Observations

- **Policing not a high enough priority in IIG and MNF I.** Apparent concentration in IIG on need for a large Army (yet no immediate external threat and reluctance/inability to use them on internal COIN operations). Need to increase number of Senior Civilian Police Advisors in CPATT, MNSTC I etc
- **Lack of Police Strategy and Plans** – where do we want to be? Credible, effective, efficient and supported. Without overall Policing Strategy this every time a 'Fallujah' occurs it is not possible to redefine your plan and head in basically the same direction. You face the risk of moving in an increasingly deviant tangent until achieving - Internal Security Force? If you don't have a clear strategy/plan and agreed standards/outcomes, the high involvement of International Advisors could create different processes in different areas.
- **Low start point** – traditional Iraqi policing style low on service high on enforcement, inherently corrupt and inefficient
- **Poor to Zero supporting infrastructure** (estate, administrators etc) (IPS and MOI – poor links).
- **Creation of Regional Policing Structures:** link between Provinces/Cities and MOI. Base for National IPS Agencies – Crime, Paramilitary Support etc.
- **Quality not Quantity – recruitment and training:** only 25% of current number may be efficient. Better to concentrate training on this quartile and introduce recruits over a longer period of time. Need for Leadership training
- **Marginal Police – Military co-ordination:** in difficult areas military role to guard police, provide secure ground in which they can operate.
- **Development of unaccountable 'Auxiliary Units':** Special Police Commandos are ex-military, not police trained, reporting to MOI. Strong Command and Control and Human Rights reservations. They work because military are not doing their job and have created a vacuum. Need identified for proper Paramilitary Support (Carabinieri Model – trained police in military formation). An Iraqi example exists in the Tactical Support Unit (TSU) in Basrah. This should be offered to IIG.
- **Iraqi involvement at planning stage:** Iraqi encouraged to lead where possible. All MNFI effort directed to support Iraqi Police Service (see UK/Italian/CF involvement in 4 Southern Provinces).

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## Recommendations

### SHORT TERM

- **Military Priority to Protect Policing Function** – guard police stations, joint patrolling. Harden police stations. If very high security risk, police operate from military bases.
- **High level support for International Police Expertise for Training (all levels) and Advisory Support:** include police supporting infrastructure, police station management and estate issues
- **MNFI support to 'special Commando' Battalions.** Reservations noted and attempts to resolve command and control, training and link to other Iraqi police Units. General Adnan indicates that his units already act as a QRF in many cities where police are threatened.
- **Police Training 'on ground' increased.** PATs imbedded on local police stations/units. Phased approach subject to rigorous evaluation and assessment (with Iraqis). Development of IPA functions in areas where security threat is lower..
- **Joint Coordinating Centres established:** Police lead but involving all allied policing/military bodies.
- **Work with MOI/IPS Police Chiefs to develop a 3 – 5 Year Policing Strategy:** Must fit as part of overall Iraqi Counter Insurgency Strategy. Need for **1 yr Policing Plan (2005/6)** to set priorities, ensure immediate progress and monitor/assess performance.
- **Creation and Training of a Special Branch (COIN/CT) and Criminal Intelligence Organisation (National) within IPS:** essential to ensure that as police interact with community this intelligence is collected, analysed and auctioned.
- **Develop MOI/IPS Support Infrastructure (BATS):** Review of police estate – location, defensibility, assessability, facilities, number,

### MID TERM

- **Integrated Criminal Justice Strategy:** Provincial and local co-ordination of Police/Courts/Prison. Police cannot operate in a vacuum.
- **Mature Police Command and Control Structure and Co-Ordination with Military.**
- **Convert Special Police Commandos to Paramilitary Support:** Police Training through imbedded PATs (police AND military trainers.

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Bring under Provincial/Regional Police Command and Discipline. Remove 'non-desirables'.

- **Leadership Development Programmes:** Identify at lower and middle command level 'leaders of tomorrow'. 'High Potential' Schemes to accelerate these through the ranks. Police Staff College. Overseas – FBI Academy, Centrex (UK), Italy etc.

#### LONG TERM

- **Develop Police capability, CC and structure to take 'Primacy' in COIN and CT Operations.** Military to co-ordinate and operate as directed. Priority Military Task (Internal) to provide support to military. *police*
- **Develop of Iraqi Police Training Capability:** Iraqi mentors to new police recruits, involvement in PATs.
- **Production of an Iraqi Policing Plan written by IPS.**
- **IPS Inspectorate:** review training, quality. Set performance standards and targets for local Police Chiefs. Oversight of Professional Standards Departments.
- **Creation of National Investigative Capability:** National Squads located regionally – Major Crime (Murder and Serious Sexual Offence), Organised Crime (Drugs, Fraud etc), Asset Recovery, Criminal Intelligence, Forensic etc.

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