

Friday, 4 December 2009

(10.00 am)

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning everyone and welcome, and welcome to our witness, Lieutenant General Sir Anthony Pigott.

The objectives this morning, we are building on what we heard yesterday from Lord Boyce and Sir Kevin Tebbit and we are looking further about how the United Kingdom's participation in the invasion of Iraq was -- I'm using the word "planned", but we may need to unpack that word -- in our jargon, planned, what options were considered, when the key decisions were taken and how this was linked to the wider diplomatic process going on at the same time. We are also beginning to explore planning for after the invasion and the assumptions that were made about the United Kingdom's military role in that.

The session covers from 2002 up to the eve of the invasion, including what we thought would happen afterwards. Next week, we will hear about the invasion itself from two of the commanders who led British forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge and Lieutenant General Robin Brims.

This morning, we will hear first from Sir Anthony and after the break from Major General David Wilson. We

1 recognise that witnesses are giving evidence based on  
2 their recollection of events. We, for our part, are  
3 checking what we hear against the papers to which we  
4 have access and which we are still receiving. It is  
5 a very large archive already.

6 I remind every witness that they will later be asked  
7 to sign a transcript of their evidence to the effect  
8 that the evidence they have given is truthful, fair and  
9 accurate.

10 With those preliminaries, I will hand over to  
11 Sir Martin Gilbert.

12 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Sir Anthony, I wonder if you could  
14 begin by describing to us your part in the planning  
15 guidance process for the beginning of 2002 and where you  
16 yourself fitted into the planning mechanism and purpose?

17 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: If I give you a flavour of what  
18 the DCS's commitments (DCDS (C)) used to do. It has moved on, of  
19 course. Indeed, its title has changed from DCS  
20 commitments to DCS operations. That's part of the  
21 lessons. It certainly was a view that I had, that it  
22 would be sensible to move in that direction.

23 The DCDS(C) of my era had a very clear job. He was  
24 the military strategic focus, as a staff officer, to the  
25 Chief of Defence Staff. In my time discovering your

1 areas of interest, that included Admiral Boyce, and  
2 then, briefly, General Walker, I think for about three  
3 or four months. So largely, Admiral Boyce was my boss  
4 for that time.

5 We'll get into, inevitably, some terribly  
6 comfortable doctrinal terms to a military man, which  
7 I absolutely recognise don't mean the same thing to the  
8 non-military, and all I would just ask, if I stray into  
9 that error, would somebody just stick their hand up and  
10 I'll try to explain it a bit better.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: You might, if you choose, give us a very  
12 brief outline of your understanding and what you think  
13 we ought to use as a descriptor.

14 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Very happy to. Ministries, the  
15 world over, of defence, but certainly the A team defence  
16 players, plan and they execute operations. They may, if  
17 they are co-located with the Department of State, have  
18 a role into management of defence resources, but that's  
19 way out of our business.

20 So it is current ops direction on behalf of the CDS  
21 who takes the military decisions with ministers wherever  
22 necessary, but I, as the principal staff officer, would  
23 make it happen, either within the Ministry or into the  
24 operational chain of command, into the joint commander,  
25 who, in an ideal world, would have perhaps been with me

1       today, because it would have fitted very neatly, but it  
2       is not practical, I know. So working into the joint  
3       commander who then works to the components; "component"  
4       meaning land component, maritime component and air  
5       component, the special forces component, if deployed,  
6       a logistic component. So you have got this component  
7       sense, each with their own responsibilities.

8       A situation would arise, some might go through it in  
9       a vignette way. Because it is a Friday morning, it  
10      might interest you, but I think it illustrates so many  
11      of the things that happen. Here I'm just trying to give  
12      you a flavour of my role in crisis management.

13      So the DCDS (C) of the day runs the defence crisis  
14      management machinery on behalf of the Chief of Defence  
15      Staff and, indeed, on behalf of the Secretary of State  
16      for Defence. He runs that machinery. I could do a very  
17      quick flavour on what that machinery means, unless  
18      everybody knows.

19   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Perhaps I could ask you, in that  
20      context, if you could tell us when you first became  
21      involved in looking at the options for possible military  
22      action in Iraq and how that fitted in --

23   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Okay. Let me take you into  
24      where I sat and talked to as routine. Routine dialogue  
25      within the Ministry of Defence, was the CDS Secretary of

1 State, Policy Director hugely of the day. Lots of  
2 discussions with the service chiefs, who are the force  
3 providers who may have a particular view that they  
4 wanted me to perhaps look at on their or some other's  
5 behalf. So the service chiefs.

6 Also, but less personally, because it was others'  
7 responsibility, my team would be working into the  
8 Services Command Headquarters. So the  
9 Commander-in-chief land at Wilton, the  
10 Commander-in-chief air at High Wycombe, and maritime,  
11 which had not yet moved down to -- they were still on  
12 vocation. Talking to them.

13 On the international routes, I would be talking to  
14 my opposite numbers in the joint staffs in Washington.  
15 That was my focus into the Americans, through the joint  
16 staff. I did not get overly involved, and nor should I,  
17 in the joint commander's role with the Central Command  
18 commander, General Tommy Franks.

19 Yes, we were interested in that. Why? Because in  
20 the American system it is not immediately clear where  
21 the strategic command sits. Here in the UK it sits  
22 absolutely with the CDS, and the chain of command is  
23 very clear. With the US, it sits -- General Franks had  
24 two hats. He had the hat back to the Commander-in-chief  
25 and through the Sec Def, but he also had a hat as the

1 operational commander. So it is mixed.

2 I would, therefore, if I wanted to talk on  
3 a Mil/Strategic issue, I would really be in to pushing  
4 towards policy, pushing towards strategy, I would be  
5 talking to Washington. If it was a current ops sort of  
6 strategic issue, I would be talking to Tampa.

7 General David Wilson, who is here today, he was both  
8 mine, but principally the joint commander's two-star fly  
9 on the wall in Tampa. Able to take the concerns, take  
10 the issues, work them back to PJHQ in London.

11 Occasionally, he would ring me, but not very often,  
12 because that is not the geography.

13 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Can I take you, at this point, to  
14 Washington?

15 Before the Prime Minister's meeting with  
16 President Bush at Crawford, you visited Washington with  
17 Desmond Bowen, whom we will be talking to soon. Whom  
18 did you see there, what was their mood, and what did you  
19 learn from them about American military thinking at that  
20 time with regard to Iraq?

21 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I went to Washington a lot of  
22 times and I'm not quite sure of the particular -- if it  
23 is a particular date you are referring to --

24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: The very beginning of April.

25 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: -- as opposed to the generic --

1 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Immediately before -- pre-Crawford.

2 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes. My links into the joint

3 staff, very eminent US Admiral -- top notch. These are

4 today's Central Command -- they are the top of the shop

5 and they would work back into the Chairman of the Joint

6 Chiefs and I would be discussing with them things,

7 nothing to do with Iraq necessarily, just our routine

8 interests. It might be a Balkans issue, it might be

9 a whole range of things that were still going on.

10 Indeed, that was the normal dialogue.

11 The Iraq thing was, in the early days, obviously an

12 added dimension when you started thinking into the

13 future, but the main business around that time was the

14 other operations that were running, the No Fly Zones,

15 which had huge issues involved in it, happy to discuss

16 those, the No Fly Zones, the Balkans and where that was

17 going for the Brits, Northern Ireland and where or

18 wasn't that still going? Afghanistan 1, which had by

19 then happened post-11/9, and the UK had taken over the

20 force command in Kabul there and where was that going

21 and how were the European nations going to dovetail into

22 the demands from Kabul as well as the demands from

23 CentCom to the ...

24 So I wanted to give that you flavour of quite a lot

25 of talking to quite a lot of people on both the national

1       and the multinational side as a routine, as a routine.

2           I could -- you know, I could relate the immediate  
3       post-11/9 vignette, if it would be helpful to you,  
4       because you would see that unfolding. Here is a classic  
5       strategic shock. This is why you have crisis management  
6       machinery tied up ready to respond, albeit not very  
7       frequently to that sort of thing. Everybody will have  
8       their own memories of that.

9           I was en route, at that time, to Sierra Leone on  
10       a routine DCS commitments having got involved in  
11       Sierra Leone on routine discussions to see where we were  
12       going next. Aftermath Sierra Leone, if you like, but  
13       obviously a completely different scale but..and we landed at  
14       Dakar on the way, and I was thrust a bit of paper  
15       saying there had been an accident in New York and just  
16       be aware of it, and by the time we got to, you know, the  
17       embassy, there was another note saying, you know --  
18       well, this was no place for the Deputy Chief of Defence  
19       Staff Operations to be in Dakar with this going on. So  
20       we come back to the UK. That's great. Into Northolt.  
21       That's great. Clearly a big crisis. I would be talking  
22       to CDS as we landed on the way, "What's the feel on  
23       this?" I spoke to my staff in Wash.. -- in London  
24       and said get a combined operational group meeting stood  
25       up for 4 o'clock, short notice. This is a team. The



1 name may have changed recently, but this is a team which  
2 is on 20 minutes' notice, 20 minutes' notice to drop  
3 everything and come to the defence crisis management  
4 machinery. It doesn't matter what rank, whoever is  
5 there, come and start owning the problem and looking at  
6 the options.

7 So that - that Northolt traffic into London, 40 minutes,  
8 that sort of thing and then into a meeting completely --  
9 I was out of the loop really, except for these two bits  
10 of paper.

11 Okay. Number 1 issue of crisis management: what are  
12 we dealing with here? What is this? Is this something  
13 big or is it something small? Does it look big but  
14 turns out to be small? Does it look small but turns out to  
15 be big? What are we dealing with? Number 1 lesson,  
16 the what and the why. What are we dealing with? Why  
17 are we doing it? The in order to. This is very much  
18 the senior military and political space. The boys and  
19 girls downstream will do all sorts of things, but they  
20 need that what and why. For Iraq, as for anywhere else,  
21 what and why.

22 They then need the bit beyond that, the what, the  
23 why, the when. Are we talking about, you know, looking  
24 at options for Ministers, you know, in a month's time,  
25 are we talking about 3 o'clock this afternoon? What

1 sort of tempo, political tempo, military tempo to match  
2 is beginning to come out?

3 Well, you know, with retrospect, people have a much  
4 better clue of 9/11, but at the time, they had no clue,  
5 and they did not know whether this was phase 1 of  
6 a 5-phase attack across -- you know, they just did not  
7 know that. That only became clearer as things moved on.  
8 The with whom. Who are your allies? It links with the  
9 other Ws. Who are your allies? Who are you going to be  
10 dealing with? Is it going to be a NATO operation? Is  
11 it going to be UN-led? Is it a coalition based on the  
12 Brits? Where does that fit in? Immediately, it will  
13 start giving you an indication much what sort of assets  
14 and resources and intent that the coalition may have,  
15 you know, out there.

16 So that comes into play. Then I think --

17 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If I can move you forward. With the same  
18 whens and whys, go back to your visit to Washington on  
19 the very eve of the Crawford meeting when you went with  
20 Desmond Bowen. What did you find there about American  
21 thinking? Where did Iraq stand in the agenda at that  
22 time?

23 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: It is such an important country.  
24 I'm trying to give you a flavour. It doesn't sort of  
25 come on the agenda. Something as big as the

1 Middle East, which, you know, Iraq is absolutely on the  
2 agenda, full stop. So one's -- one is docking into  
3 something which is moving and has been -- and has been  
4 moving.

5 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Was there a change at that point with  
6 regard to the Americans' thinking in terms of military  
7 planning?

8 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Not at the level I was talking  
9 with and to. I mean, I had an extremely close  
10 relationship with the key players in the joint staff.  
11 It was very much professional friends over the years and  
12 there was no question of somebody coming along and  
13 saying, "Tell us what is going on". It is a much easier  
14 relationship, but in that area, into the J5, as it is  
15 militarily called, although that's just a structural  
16 term, into that area I would plug in my own thinking  
17 without any sort of commitment and they are not clumsy  
18 to sort of saying -- they are not clumsy people. They  
19 are not going to say, "We won't talk to you unless you  
20 guarantee ..." that's not the way. It was, "Yes, Tony,  
21 we are doing a bit more on this". This is not the  
22 American Government, this is an individual senior  
23 officer in the American Government who --

24 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Did they at that time envisage a place  
25 with the United Kingdom in whatever role --

1 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I think, you know -- we all know  
2 this. Such is the strength of the British/American  
3 relationship. I mean it would be a fairly strange  
4 wallah if they thought they were going off on an  
5 operation, to not think, "Well, the Brits" -- I mean,  
6 that would -- the working level -- this is not policy.  
7 This is just my opposite number in Washington who would  
8 be looking around for assets. Of course he would, and  
9 resources, and I'm sure he was having discussions with  
10 the Turks and with the Spaniards and with -- you know,  
11 a wide array of nations. Of course they were doing that  
12 in that sort of -- that period of planning when I would  
13 put it down to scoping.

14 People -- I think this is where I can help -- an  
15 awful lot of things go on on the planning side, which  
16 start really, "There is a bit of a whiff going on here  
17 on something. Anybody else getting any collateral?".  
18 "Well, no, nothing heard here". Okay, probably park it  
19 in the pending tray, a judgment having been made that it  
20 goes in the pending tray, and, as the process goes on,  
21 you might move that up to liaison authority. We might  
22 give some -- headquarters, PJHQ, the right to establish  
23 liaison -- according authority or liaison authority with  
24 another headquarters. That would mean something very  
25 specific. It would mean you could go and talk A, B, C

1           and D, but you couldn't talk X, Y, Z and J.

2   THE CHAIRMAN:   Could I just interject to ask you,

3           Sir Anthony, whose authority is needed to establish that

4           kind of liaison relationship?  Political authority or

5           top level military authority?

6   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  If I give you the sense -- it is

7           an unusual construct in Whitehall against other nations.

8           I mean the top level operational staff are integrated

9           with the Policy Director and the military.  We are not

10          anywhere else.  They are split.  They are separate in

11          Washington, where you have the joint chiefs and you have

12          Sec Def's staff and there is quite a gap between there,

13          both physically and, you know, in terms of developing

14          ideas.  Not so here.

15                 So something like liaison authority to look at

16          potential operations in Zimbabwe, you know, not likely

17          to happen, but it might, something might be required,

18          and you'd look a bit of an idiot if you haven't started

19          doing at least some scoping.

20                 So, I, with the Policy Director, we might go to

21          Ministers, you know, given that particular one, would be

22          able to say to PJHQ, "We want some scoping work done.

23          We do not want it make a big deal of this.  Here is your

24          scoping directive, if you like.  Talk it through.  We

25          want to know how we might get air access, how the UN

1        might look at it". You get a feel and then you say,  
2        "Okay, happy with that. Park it just in case it comes  
3        up". That sort of liaison authority is working stuff.

4    SIR MARTIN GILBERT: At this particular period when clearly  
5        the Prime Minister was going to be having some dialogue  
6        with the President with regard to Iraq and you are in  
7        Washington a few days before, were you able to have  
8        a discussion or were you able to suggest what the  
9        United Kingdom role might be within their evolving  
10       strategic concepts?

11   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I'm going to have to press you  
12       again on which date. I'm in danger of mixing up visits.

13   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Beginning of April. The very beginning  
14       of April, just before you then came back and -- I want  
15       to ask you a little bit about what happened when you  
16       came back.

17   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: You are talking  
18       about April 2002?

19   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Yes.

20   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: My focus, April 2002, was much  
21       more on Kabul and ISAF and the British having taken  
22       command in the Bonn conference in December of the  
23       previous year. So three months after 11/9, Bonn  
24       conference, UK puts its hand up and says it will take  
25       command of the international security assistance force

1       and everybody else moved to the back, one and all, and  
2       said, "Not us, not yet".

3           Again, a classic little thing, not a big deal, but  
4       a lot of issues that would need to be put together. So  
5       my focus was very much on there and I would be  
6       keeping -- talking to the joint staffs on what their  
7       feel was for Afghanistan, not for Iraq. "How are you  
8       going to play this?" This was a very interim position,  
9       just small force in Kabul and this had to move in some  
10      direction. So that's my very firm recollection.

11           I knew Crawford was going on, but doubtless there  
12      were people briefing the Prime Minister and whatever.  
13      I certainly wasn't and nor did I sense any of the  
14      interlocutors in Washington that I dealt with were  
15      engaged on that. They were engaged, at that stage on,  
16      "Could you help us to get the Turks to take over ISAF in  
17      six months' time?" That would be a good example. We  
18      could have no leverage on the Turks. Why would we have?  
19      But we did have dialogue with the -- I had dialogue with  
20      military opposite numbers saying, "Given that Turkey is  
21      run by the Turkish general staff, is there a way you can  
22      help us to get Turkey to take on role vice us in Kabul.  
23      That was heavy lifting.

24   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: When you returned from this particular  
25      visit, at the beginning of April, you were one of those who is

1           recorded as having been at Chequers on the very eve of  
2           the Prime Minister going to Washington to Texas, to  
3           Crawford, and I was wondering whether you can recall  
4           what the discussion was, what --

5   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  No.  I really can't.

6           Crawford -- perhaps I was out of the country at the  
7           time, whatever.  It just wasn't something on my  
8           personal --

9   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  There is in the public domain  
10          a recollection of you briefing the Prime Minister on  
11          2 April.

12  LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  What, at Chequers?

13  SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  At Chequers.

14  LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  I used to go to Chequers  
15          occasionally when the Prime Minister you know had a small group  
16          and if CDS was not free or was away or whatever --

17  SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:  According to this account, CDS was  
18          there as well. (repeated)

19  LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  Okay.  Well, I am afraid I would  
20          have to get my diary out.  I have a recollection of  
21          Chequers many times -- well, "many times", four or five  
22          over a long period.

23  SIR MARTIN GILBERT:  And you have no recollection of this  
24          discussion about whether the United Kingdom should be  
25          involved formally in the American pre-planning?



1 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: No, I haven't, nor would I --  
2 again, I go back to -- I mean, the way in here would  
3 have been the Policy Director working with, I imagine,  
4 Sir David Manning and, you know, the other key policy  
5 people. Simon Webb and myself, like that, we didn't  
6 meet -- bump into each other occasionally on -- we lived  
7 in each other's pockets. I knew what he felt and he  
8 knew what I felt. These were just official level  
9 discussions, military to military.

10 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: After the Crawford meeting, you were  
11 involved in setting up a small group that I believe  
12 was called the Pigott Group.

13 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Oh, was it?

14 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Can you recall why it was set up and  
15 what it sought to do with regard to this question of  
16 whether the United Kingdom should have some say in some  
17 relationship with the American planning process?

18 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, yes. I mean, as a DCS  
19 commitments, responsible for current ops and future  
20 plans, I did set up a small team working, you know, to  
21 me and Policy Director really, to do some scoping work.  
22 I mean, here it is absolutely coming back into the  
23 scoping. Not to do some planning, we need to do some  
24 scoping work. What could we be dealing with here? What  
25 might be the big issues? Where might these -- as I was

1       describing to you -- the what, when, where. What were  
2       they beginning to look like, because if you had a zero  
3       response to all those things, that's pretty shaky  
4       ground to get on. If you have at least a knowledge as to what those  
5       questions, then you are halfway there to talk sense.

6       People, from quite early on, you know -- Sir Roderic  
7       will, you know, I'm sure, have this flavour as well.

8       This tempo of discussion on the key issue, when it comes  
9       up, is routine. It is routine. There comes a point at  
10      which it moves from the routine into the specific, but  
11      I have no recollection as early as that, as early  
12      as March/April 2002, of, you know, that sort of detailed  
13      discussion.

14   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Do you recall at the end of June --

15   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Afghanistan was my focus.

16   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Do you recall at the end of June your  
17      visit to Central Command?

18   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Ah yes, quite different timeframe.

19   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What there was the thinking about Iraq?

20   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: As the scoping became clear and  
21      as political intent evolved on either just options or  
22      whatever -- and I can share with you, I'm pretty sure it  
23      was options, options, options only. We were not talking  
24      about plans at that stage. We were talking about  
25      options, for obvious reasons, and my job was to bring

1 options, and we would do that in what -- if I could use  
2 the term which is so familiar to people you will be  
3 seeing later on, who wear uniform, we did that through  
4 a normal mechanism of what is called a strategic  
5 estimate.

6 I should better call it the military strategic  
7 estimate. This is nothing more than a process, but it  
8 is rigorous and it is to stop the off-the-cuff sort of,  
9 "Let's go and do that". You know, it is rigorous, and  
10 it starts off with the understanding of the higher level  
11 intent, of the political intent, or, for my part, the  
12 Secretary of State's intent or CDS's intent. I mean,  
13 the intent could come from -- but I could not go on down  
14 such a path until one was clear what that intent was  
15 looking like.

16 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Before I hand you over to  
17 Sir Lawrence Freedman, I have one more question about  
18 your visit to Tampa which seems to have been important,  
19 certainly from our perspective.

20 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: The Tampa visit, yes, 28 June.  
21 David Wilson, whom I took with me, a very good example.  
22 He met me in Washington, then we went with back down to  
23 Tampa where he was stationed and produced all sorts of  
24 insights which I know he will share.

25 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What did you, yourself, find there with

1       regard to American thinking on Iraq and whether they had  
2       any sense of what they would like us to do if we could  
3       do that?

4   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  Again, I'm going to pull you  
5       back to Washington for the better picture on CentCom;  
6       it's joint commander business.  Not my..Yes, you know, once  
7       again, I can't make sensible judgments on the strategic  
8       end, if one doesn't know what the operational concerns  
9       are, but CentCom, Tampa, is very much joint commander's  
10      space.

11         Washington, where, completely naturally, I went to  
12      before going to Tampa, to Washington, not the other way  
13      round.  Go to Washington first to get a feel for what  
14      the joint chief thinking would be.  That would be  
15      a one-to-one discussion you know with one or two or three --  
16      three or four senior people.

17   SIR MARTIN GILBERT:  What feel did you get?

18   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  The feel, I think, from the  
19      military was -- I think you have to go back a little bit  
20      to 11/9 and the dramatic impact that was still having  
21      and has to this day on top level -- I mean -- you know,  
22      a really serious impact on their thinking.

23         The scoping of options was beginning to be clear in  
24      my mind, not as a staff exercise.  In my mind, because  
25      talking to senior people in the London end, there is

1       enough talent and -- you know, to come to those  
2       conclusions on the sort of outline approach that you  
3       should be taking. It would be hard, it would be hard to give an  
4       impression anywhere that the US didn't want the Brits  
5       there. From a straight military side, of course they  
6       did, of course they would want it, not just for  
7       political but for military as well.

8           I just slightly hesitate for the "military as well",  
9       because they have enough "combat power" to do without  
10      but winning operations and campaigns is more than combat  
11      power. I think David Wilson might give you a little  
12      vignette again on that from a very senior officer.

13           "What we want from the Brits is sort of ideas and  
14      feel". I mean, you know, he was joking really. But,  
15      "You are the thinkers for the" -- you know, but that's  
16      only a banter between us, but it gives you a flavour --  
17      it gives you a flavour and that's how it was working  
18      out.

19   SIR MARTIN GILBERT: At that time, were you able to put  
20      something into this thinking pot?

21   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: It wasn't very difficult. We  
22      had a pretty small set-up now. It was not difficult to  
23      see that, if you are ending up -- I mean, I can do it in  
24      my head -- ending up with a sort of military operation  
25      to get you to Baghdad and create conditions for

1       subsequent -- you know, there aren't too many options  
2       for the army with only six brigades and maritime and  
3       air.

4           I know, reading your transcript from yesterday, you  
5       got into some discussion here on the packages,  
6       so-called, the big package or the small package. I'm  
7       very happy to talk to that as it unfolds. I hope I'm  
8       giving you a flavour that Iraq was not at the top of any  
9       Mil/Mil agenda at that stage.

10   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Sir Anthony, you said that in the  
11       UK, the interaction between the policy side and the  
12       military side was very close and you worked very closely  
13       with Simon Webb.

14           What I'm not really getting hold of is, what were  
15       the options that were being discussed? What was the  
16       mood like in the United States, you know, what was the  
17       mood here, and what were the options that you discussed  
18       with Simon Webb, which may have been put into the  
19       planning before Crawford? What was your input into  
20       that?

21   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, where were we by that  
22       stage? We had probably got a pretty good feel for  
23       intent and for the British intent in this, the top level  
24       policy intent, I mean, the policy intent was positioned  
25       in the House of Commons and, you know, there it is, so

1       there is your statement. That was becoming firm, so  
2       what did Her Majesty's Government -- in which direction  
3       did they want to go was now in the public -- I think  
4       I have got the timing roughly right -- was now in the  
5       public domain. From that, we had done the estimate work  
6       that I described --

7   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: No, I'm not wanting -- it is really  
8       the options which you and Simon Webb had been discussing  
9       prior to the Crawford meeting. In which direction?  
10      What input did you make to that discussion?

11   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Erm, well, the options, I think,  
12      you know, were what would be courses of action in sort  
13      of military -- more military spark, and that would come  
14      out of where the strategic estimate planning had got to  
15      at that stage, and I mean, I'd have to come back to you  
16      on the detail, but there is clearly option A was to do nothing,  
17      with all its pluses and minuses, of which the minuses,  
18      to me, completely outweighed the pluses.

19      Then you had sub-options within there between the  
20      components. We could have put the land component and  
21      a maritime component or we could do some finessing the  
22      other way round or whatever, and there were some pluses  
23      and some minuses, which were obvious, and then there  
24      were the options that gave an outline to your  
25      discussions yesterday afternoon on the package 3, which

1       essentially by then were strategic enablers, everybody  
2       wants those, strategic enablers, tankers, tanker  
3       aircraft, intelligence assets, all that sort of space  
4       which everybody is short with and they want.

5           So strategic enablers, I would probably put special  
6       forces perhaps. Strategic enablers in huge demand.  
7       So to give you that flavour, strategic enablers are  
8       what people wanted, and then there were, I suppose,  
9       options which were largely of an in-support nature. You  
10      know, perhaps an element of air, land and sea which was  
11      demonstrably in support. It didn't buy you a seat at  
12      the table, but you were there. I mean -- and many  
13      nations do that, as you know, they come along and they  
14      park alongside and you know, that sort -- that tends not  
15      to be the British political style that I'm familiar  
16      with.

17           It is much more -- and the option 3 is much more,  
18      "Give us a leading role and we will" -- I'm not saying  
19      "we", if the political machine wants to go down there,  
20      there are some military options which would give you  
21      a land component, a maritime and an air component,  
22      working jointly under proper command, giving you the  
23      flexibility to take on a major line of operation, and  
24      a major line of operation, of course, was Basra, and if  
25      you didn't end up -- and I could talk to that, the



1 importance of having that sort of force structure in  
2 taking on a responsibility for something as big as Basra  
3 and how that was handled, which wasn't -- you know, once  
4 the UK main effort within -- what became the main  
5 effort within the Iraq story. Does that answer your  
6 question?

7 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Up to a point.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Anthony, we are all anxious to get in,  
9 I know and it is Sir Lawrence's turn, but I think before  
10 then I have a question and so has Sir Roderic. Mine is  
11 simply this: after Crawford, the summer of 02, you set  
12 in train the military strategic process?

13 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: No, I set in train the scoping.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: To do which, I think you said you relied on  
15 there being an intent.

16 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: What was your understanding of that intent at  
18 that time, summer 2002?

19 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: My understanding of the UK  
20 intent was as laid out in the -- in the House of  
21 Commons. I mean, you know --

22 THE CHAIRMAN: It was not until November was there any  
23 statement about doing contingency planning.

24 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: No, but the -- again, the intent  
25 which said, "We want Iraq to do this and that" --

1 THE CHAIRMAN: I see.

2 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: -- that was the intent, at the  
3 strategic end. I mean, there was no higher intent that  
4 I was aware of than that.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: I suppose, just to round off my question,  
6 I don't want to press it, there is not, as it were,  
7 a formal statement of intent from which the Mil/Strat  
8 process proceeds?

9 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: There is pretty well. I mean,  
10 the intent is critical, and estimates that go off  
11 without an intent from a senior authority --

12 THE CHAIRMAN: So you would get a statement of the intent  
13 from the Policy --

14 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: You quite often write it  
15 yourself and trade it around and then get Ministers --

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Endorsement for it?

17 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes. It is a critical point to  
18 planning. There is no useful planning without an  
19 understanding of the intent and the assumptions against  
20 which it is framed.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sir Roderic?

22 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Two very quick questions. By April 2002,  
23 the Prime Minister's statements of intent, did they, in  
24 your view, include the idea that we might have to effect  
25 regime change in Iraq in order to achieve the

1       disarmament of Iraq? Was regime change part of the  
2       intent?

3   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Not from my perspective, because  
4       the intent we were picking up -- again I'm talking Mil,  
5       as military people, the intent I was picking up from  
6       HMG Limited, not from the Americans, from HMG Limited,  
7       was the focus was on WMD so-called, a rather unfortunate  
8       term which I argued quite strongly at the time to get  
9       rid of and replace it with something else, but my powers  
10      of persuasion didn't achieve that, but you could come  
11      back to that in a discussion if you wanted.

12           So that was, you know, very much the sense of that,  
13      this sense on WMD, if that led to or required regime  
14      change, but that was a British business because the  
15      American business was the other way round.

16   SIR RODERIC LYNE: If that required regime change, that was,  
17      therefore, part of the picture, particularly after the  
18      speech that the Prime Minister made following his  
19      Crawford meeting with President Bush at College Station  
20      in Texas, in which he took a more forward position than  
21      the hitherto on this, which I'm sure you will have  
22      noted.

23           If I could just move on to my second question while  
24      we are still on Crawford, do you recall if the  
25      Ministry of Defence recommended to the Prime Minister

1       that when he went to see President Bush at Crawford, he  
2       should ask President Bush to involve the UK in the  
3       processes of planning or pre-planning for an operation  
4       in Iraq that the Americans were by then beginning to  
5       conduct?

6   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  Again, my focus is into the  
7       joint staffs, and between them and I, on the personal  
8       sense, there was no sense of that and we were very much  
9       in the ground of developing further the thinking, not  
10      yet in a formal sense, but in a -- in the normal  
11      dialogue of planning.

12  SIR RODERIC LYNE:  So you don't recall the MoD making such  
13      a recommendation, but this is very likely because it  
14      wouldn't have come through your channel, but the Pol/Mil  
15      channel, if there was such a recommendation

16  LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  It probably would have done, but  
17      I may have been somewhere else.

18  SIR RODERIC LYNE:  Thank you very much.

19  LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  Again, I want to give the  
20      Policy Director and the DCS commitment who sit next to each other  
21      physically, so I mean, if there wasn't --

22  SIR RODERIC LYNE:  If the Secretary of State had made such  
23      a recommendation to the Prime Minister, you would have  
24      been consulted on it, but this is a rather fine detail  
25      that you'd need to refresh your memory by looking at the

1 papers to give me a clear answer to that question?

2 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I'm just going to try and bring

3 you back from this feel of very formalised. At this

4 stage, it was informal dialogue at a senior level. As

5 I say, the options, you could put to any staff college

6 student who would come up --

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: But papers were being written on this and

8 discussions were happening at Chequers. The

9 Prime Minister was briefing himself very carefully

10 before he went to Crawford --

11 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Of course.

12 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- on a number of issues, not just this

13 one, as we have already heard. Okay, let's not pursue

14 this further. Thank you

15 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can I take you then in to try to get

16 through the substance of what was being proposed,

17 developed, in your scoping exercise? I guess we are

18 talking really to the period up to -- through July.

19 As I understand it, by the end of July, the

20 Americans had developed their own concept reasonably

21 clearly. It wasn't until then that they had fixed on

22 the sort of size of force they might need or sort of

23 operation they would have. So we are seeing how we

24 fit in with this up to this point.

25 Now, you have given some indication of the sort of

1       three levels of support you could give the enablers, the  
2       support, the full combat role. You have given a sense  
3       that you almost thought it was unthinkable that the  
4       British would want to provide anything other than a full  
5       combat role. Is that fair?

6   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: No that's not fair, nowhere near  
7       as far as that. We are talking about scoping  
8       discussions at senior working level, you know, looking  
9       at options. It cannot be translated into, "Well, this  
10      is just a procedure you are going down and at the end of  
11      the day we are going to go with that and it is  
12      a stitched-up deal".

13   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I'm not suggesting that.

14   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: That was not anywhere near that  
15      sort of approach.

16   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: But going back to what you have said  
17      before, you said the doing nothing option, that the  
18      minuses connected with that outweighed the pluses, so  
19      there was always an assumption we would do something.  
20      Is that fair?

21   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I think as an unfair assumption  
22      until you bring in the legality issue. Absolutely  
23      throughout all these, you know, there is a basic  
24      assumption that either there was a legal use of military  
25      force, or there would be, come the time --

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I fully understand that there is  
2 a political decision to be made as to whether or not  
3 a military operation is appropriate in a wider  
4 geopolitical/legal context and so on, and these  
5 decisions are well down the line, but to the extent that  
6 we are going to get involved, what is it that we should  
7 think about doing? What makes the most sense, accepting  
8 there is a political decision to come?

9 I'm just trying to get a sense in, as you scope, you  
10 must start to feel that one of these options is more  
11 attractive than another. They all have their place. It  
12 is that sense that I'm really trying to get at.

13 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: That's exactly what the -- you  
14 know, the estimate was there to do, to develop the  
15 courses of action, to then analyse them, the pluses and  
16 minuses, and to look in some sort of judgment way from  
17 that as to, "That looks more likely to meet HMG's  
18 objectives than that one". It is going back to the  
19 intent.

20 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So if we take the two that were most  
21 actively considered during the course of 2002, these  
22 were either what you called support, where we provide  
23 elements of maritime, air and land, or a division, or  
24 plus a division, which is package 3.

25 So how would you describe and how would you have

1       described to others in the Ministry of Defence or in the  
2       government the pluses and minuses with those two  
3       options? Let's start with package 2, which is the basic  
4       support role.

5   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, I think -- again, I'm back  
6       on my estimate approach, which you won't push me on  
7       because that's how it needs to be done. That's the  
8       rigour that comes on.

9       When one is looking at course A versus course B,  
10      which do you -- you have to develop some criteria. You  
11      need some political criteria. You need some military  
12      criteria, you need some criteria from other players in  
13      the game, you know, bordering countries. You need some  
14      criteria.

15   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So what were your criteria?

16   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: They would have been all of  
17      those and more, absolutely.

18   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Can we go through them to try to pin  
19      them down? You have indicated that the Americans don't  
20      necessarily need combat strength because they have got  
21      masses of it, but there are maybe particular  
22      contributions the British could make.

23      You have indicated that there is a question of the  
24      political support they might want and the political  
25      influence we might want. Perhaps there is a question of



1           what other countries are doing. Perhaps there is  
2           a question of cost. Are those the sort of criteria?  
3   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes, all of those, and it  
4           becomes, you know -- the issue, for example, on sort of,  
5           do you want a major role or do you want a parking role.  
6   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So this is the question.  
7   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: That's absolutely critical.  
8           I can give you any number of options for the parking  
9           role. Just want to be there, but not to be seen too  
10          much, that sort of approach. If you want to go on the  
11          major axis of the military campaign, you need  
12          a different approach, and I should develop that because  
13          this was the growing British guidance, we did want -- it  
14          was not the Ministry of Defence, there was this growing  
15          feel that if you were -- "if" you were -- and if the  
16          legal things were all in place, all of that "if", there  
17          is more interest in a defined role, not for some sort of  
18          aggrandisement sort of thing but makes an operational  
19          contribution, not just a sort of nuisance, but makes an  
20          operational contribution.  
21   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: So this does suggest that the  
22          inclination is to go for the package 3, which is --  
23   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: If you want -- the inclination  
24          was, if you want -- if you want to have politically  
25          a line of operation, Basra is -- I mean Basra is a major

1 task.

2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Basra doesn't come into the picture  
3 until 2003 in terms of briefings of Ministers anyway.  
4 It may have come in earlier in terms of your scoping,  
5 but it is certainly not there until 2003. We are  
6 talking 2002 right until the end on the north. So we  
7 are just talking about a big role at the moment.

8 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes, but it slips into the  
9 Turkey discussion I saw you had and it links into -- we  
10 didn't have a blank sheet of paper on big roles.  
11 I mean, it was a remarkable -- I say that underlined --  
12 a remarkable and I say that underlined a logistic achievement to get  
that force  
13 structure in that timeframe into there to play a leading  
14 role. The capacity to play a leading role which might  
15 have taken you further was beyond our logistic  
16 capability. It just absolutely -- so if you look at  
17 Iraq from the bottom end, there is desert on the left,  
18 and on the right there is the oil refineries and the  
19 water and Basra. There isn't anything else. There is  
20 Baghdad, American territory and logistically almost  
21 beyond our -- you know, even if -- I mean not really a start.

22 An then there was possible option on the north, as the  
23 north and -- option from the US side began to come up.  
24 The US side -- I mean, you know, relations with Turkey  
25 were obvious, very strong, there were all sorts of

1 strategic issues involved in why that was -- why that  
2 came on the agenda and moved to this. The NATO planners  
3 had, you know, all sorts of plans that got you into sort  
4 of the Iraqi/Turkish border area but not much that took  
5 you beyond that.

6 So it was almost -- if you want to play on a line of  
7 operation of substance, you had the south, you know,  
8 once the Turkey thing closed --

9 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: I'm really trying to still get at  
10 the story during 2002, because the Turkey option didn't  
11 close until right at the end of 2002. The papers we  
12 have seen are very strong on the grounds, advocating,  
13 almost, a high profile operation, with the UK taking  
14 quite a significant part coming in through the north,  
15 through Turkey and the Kurdish areas.

16 Now, I'm interested at the moment actually not so  
17 much in the relative merits of north versus south -- and  
18 it is important to understand the importance of Basra  
19 and so on - but in where the intent, if you like, where the  
objective of

20 a large operation comes from. Is this just a sense that  
21 the politicians want this, senior officers want this or  
22 this is just the sort of thing the British do?

23 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: It is just an option that comes  
24 out of any analysis. It is just an option. I mean, you  
25 can go or you can't, it is absolute -- it is, at that

1 stage -- I mean, again we are getting ahead, the  
2 Mil/Strategic -- I have got to be aware of the political  
3 nuances, of course -- present options in a way that  
4 people can then make later judgments, and that's  
5 where -- and that's where, you know -- the south -- you  
6 know -- I remember discussing this very well. I mean,  
7 the coming in from the north through Turkey,  
8 I mean -- and squeeze from the south. You don't need to  
9 be an archbishop to see that's quite a sensible thing to  
10 do, but when you come to the Turkish option in the  
11 north, you don't hold many cards, and at the end of the  
12 day, I said to CDS the price of the carpets is too high  
13 and we can't afford it, and we had to -- he had to say,  
14 "If you want us to play, we have to stop waiting for the  
15 Turks".

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Anthony, can I ask on this, you have got  
17 your scoping study running, we have been talking --  
18 there are different options of scale as well as  
19 different approach paths, does the scoping process, the  
20 Mil/Strat process come to a conclusion before decisions  
21 are taken to move into active planning or is it  
22 something that iterates itself and goes on all the way  
23 through?

24 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well it can do both. On a different  
25 scenario it may be that the higher intent says, "And

1       give me recommendations", in other words make  
2       a judgment. It could be, and it was very much the case  
3       in this instance, we are nowhere near that yet,  
4       Military/Military options is what we are interested in,  
5       and there are no decisions, but by looking at that in  
6       a coherent way, one can decide where to go next. Bin  
7       that, don't like that, that looks okay, or "Keep all the  
8       options open", may be the direction that comes and we  
9       will see how things unfold.

10       I would like to give your panel the feel of the  
11       complexity, you know, of the whole environment in this,  
12       not just Brits, UK, but we haven't really touched on it,  
13       a very big, you know, network of --

14   THE CHAIRMAN:   Australians Spanish Turks, we know.

15   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:   Yes, you name it.

16   THE CHAIRMAN:   Sorry.

17   SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:   I do not have very many more  
18       questions. I would still be interested, in some sense,  
19       of the possibilities at least of the package 2 because,  
20       again, the reason these things seemed to go backwards  
21       and forwards -- and, as we heard from Lord Boyce  
22       yesterday, he sometimes found it -- maybe found  
23       it difficult to get a decision on taking it forward, was  
24       that there was some political inclination to go for what  
25       you described as a support package, that the costs and

1 risks and the stretch on our forces of going for the  
2 larger package might have been too great. So I was just  
3 wondering how that was presented, how do you, against  
4 your various criteria -- how does the package 2 shape  
5 up?

6 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, you talk to your opposite  
7 number in Washington and you say, you know, "What's it  
8 looking like from your end?" You have that sort of  
9 dialogue. You have got to have that upfront, in  
10 confidence, it's a huge element of trust involved. You know,  
11 in relationships and all that, because, you know, "What  
12 is it looking like from your end?" I'm constantly doing  
13 that.

14 I want to kill this sort of notion that there were  
15 little discrete things where a decision was made and  
16 there wasn't much going on until the next decision. All  
17 the time, as factors were changing, the positions were  
18 changing, Saddam's position and intent were changing, UN  
19 things were changing, European nations' view was  
20 changing. We, I think -- Lawrie you've mentioned it, it is  
21 a sort of iterative process. It was hugely iterative  
22 and I said to the chiefs at the time, I said, "There  
23 will be no estimate which comes as a finished bit of  
24 work with a bit of string on it saying 'Fantastic'". It  
25 is not like that.

1 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.

2 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: It will move as the factors  
3 change and that's indeed how it happened.

4 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thank you.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I know we have got a number of  
6 other questions around our panel table. Can I start,  
7 Sir Roderic, with you?

8 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Unless you want to leave me right at the  
9 end.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: We can do. Sir Martin?

11 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I wondered in the examinations that you  
12 were making, to what extent did aftermath come into it?  
13 In other words, to what extent did you have to look at  
14 and advise on what the situation would be in Iraq once  
15 our force was there, once we were responsible.

16 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I hate the term "Phase 4" and  
17 I hate the term "aftermath" and I wouldn't have invented  
18 or used either of them myself, and the phasing of  
19 Phase 4, implies perhaps a Phase 5 or a Phase 6 and it  
20 has got this sort of nature of going on into the future  
21 and I think it is concurrent shaping all the time that  
22 is required, not Phase 4 planning, let's now plan for  
23 Phase 4. It is the wrong thinking.

24 You have to say, if we are going to go into these  
25 sort of things, typically you have a conflict prevention

1 phase, where you try to stop there being a conflict. It  
2 is largely politically-driven and diplomatically-driven  
3 and not military-driven. You have this sort of conflict  
4 prevention phase, and that was very much part of the  
5 thinking: how do you influence, in this case, Saddam?  
6 Not information, influence; how do you influence? How  
7 do you illustrate to him that, you know, if he doesn't  
8 do anything, he doesn't move, he is going to have eight  
9 carrier battle groups on either side of, or one, or ten or  
10 three, but, you know, a large maritime force, and he is  
11 going to have a large US force coming up there, the  
12 Euphrates/Tigris. You know, now is the time to blink,  
13 otherwise there is a sort of inevitability of it.

14 So there is this conflict prevention and you can't  
15 conflict prevent on the scale of what was involved here  
16 without coercion. You have to position capability  
17 forward. So there is a sense of -- and that bit of your  
18 planning doesn't want to be covert, it wants to be  
19 absolutely overt, and planning and playing that as to  
20 which is covert and that element which you want to start  
21 getting into the mind, "This is serious", I think is  
22 terribly important.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Usha?

24 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Sir Anthony, what the understanding I'm  
25 getting is the process you are going through, the



1 process in terms of scoping and all of that, but not  
2 much substance, because, even on scoping, there must be  
3 some assumptions and objectives within which you are  
4 operating, and I'm not clear what those assumptions and  
5 objectives are and whether you were asked to give any  
6 clear indication or advice as to what would be the  
7 preferred option after you had scoped.

8 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Yes, well --

9 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The same would apply to Phase 4, the  
10 aftermath. I know you don't like that, but it seems to  
11 me you have given us a very good description of the  
12 process, but it is the substance which I'm not getting  
13 any feel for.

14 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Okay. Let me try and help again  
15 on -- slightly on this aftermath, which -- you didn't  
16 complete the question.

17 So your campaign lines up. If it is done correctly,  
18 if the intent is right, it lines up a conflict  
19 prevention strategy.

20 BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: No, about the assumptions and the  
21 objectives on which you are scoping. Because if you  
22 were interacting so closely with the policy side, you  
23 must have been given some indication, you know, what are  
24 the assumptions and what are the objectives that are to  
25 be achieved, and within that framework you would have

1       been scoping the options and you would have been asking  
2       for some advice.

3   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  I'm trying to give an impression  
4       of this happening on an almost daily basis through the  
5       defence crisis management machinery.  You know, with --  
6       you know -- with the array of people every day meeting  
7       9 o'clock in the morning, MoD, FCO, intelligence  
8       services, DFID if need be.  They are all there.  "What  
9       are the big issues?  Anything moving?", da, da, da, da,  
10      da, da, da.

11       They go back to their respective places, they  
12      network back in.  Tomorrow's meeting just the same.  
13      This ongoing constant -- I don't mean constant on  
14      a 24-hour-change basis but on a frequent-change basis, as  
15      so many of the moving parts changed their positions.  
16      I'm just trying to make that as -- I mean, that's how it  
17      works.

18   BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:  I know how it works, but I still  
19      want to get into content in terms of, you know, what  
20      were the scenarios that you were planning for, that you were  
21      asked to plan for.

22   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT:  No, not at this stage planning,  
23      just scoping of the options that you could put to  
24      Ministers to use.  I mean -- I know, you are trying to  
25      move it into planning directives and whatever, but it is

1 not how it happened and I hope I make that clear...

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Roderic, you had a question, I think.

3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes, I would like to take you back to the  
4 extent to which we achieved influence over the planning  
5 of the campaign by making the large contribution that we  
6 made.

7 Now, you said, as a number of other people have said  
8 to us, that the Americans had enough combat power to do  
9 this job without the Brits, but we have heard the  
10 argument that while our contribution, and particularly  
11 putting in a divisional-sized contribution of ground  
12 forces, was not essential to the United States  
13 militarily, it was a means of giving the United Kingdom  
14 influence by putting boots on the ground over the  
15 planning and conduct of the campaign by the  
16 United States.

17 What actual influence did we achieve by doing this?

18 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, I think influence comes in  
19 all sorts of shapes and sizes, to try and answer some  
20 of -- there comes a time in US military operations where  
21 they move from US eyes only, to US/somebody else's eyes  
22 as well. So shall we say US/UK eyes? Whether that is  
23 a procedural thing-- that is very obvious when it  
24 happens, that you are now in US/UK joint eyes.  
25 Sometimes later on, sometimes never, you get US/UK

1 coalition or core coalition members, and again the whole  
2 thing opens up. There is that sort of door opening and  
3 door closing feel that goes on. You buy that on your  
4 contribution and your willingness to put -- I don't  
5 always like "boots on the ground", people in danger. It  
6 is more than boots.

7 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We had people in danger already in the  
8 No Fly Zone and we were going to have warships, but we  
9 took the decision to add to that -- and indeed, we were  
10 going to have special forces -- but to add to that  
11 a division of ground forces. You have talked about the  
12 process. This cuts into the planning, but my question  
13 was: what was the outcome? What were the results of  
14 this?

15 We heard from the Chief of Defence Staff yesterday,  
16 the former chief, that what we ended up with was  
17 a campaign designed by Donald Rumsfeld and  
18 General Tommy Franks, which he described as "anorexic".  
19 He said, "I was always extremely concerned about the  
20 anorexic nature of the American contribution", and he  
21 criticised Rumsfeld's obsession with network-centric  
22 warfare, and he said that the campaign was desperately  
23 under-resourced in terms of boots on the ground, so far  
24 as those forces going to Baghdad were concerned, that is  
25 to say the American force.

1           So that implies that he was not happy with the way  
2           that the Americans decided to conduct the campaign. He  
3           also said in very frank terms that he had repeatedly  
4           tried to persuade the Americans -- and Kevin Tebbit  
5           I think said the same thing -- that they were not simply  
6           going to be greeted as liberators when they got to Iraq,  
7           that they had to make proper planning -- he was not  
8           worried about using the term "Phase 4" or the  
9           "aftermath" -- for what happened after they had actually  
10          secured the military victory.

11          So on these two crucial issues, our Chief of Defence  
12          Staff ended up unhappy, as he told us, with the way the  
13          campaign was conducted, but we thought that by putting  
14          a division in, we were going to influence their planning  
15          of the campaign.

16          So my question is, again: what influence did we  
17          actually achieve in the planning and conduct of the  
18          campaign by doing what we did? We were part of the club  
19          but were we listened to, did we achieve anything for the  
20          United Kingdom's interests by doing so?

21   LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well let's try and make headway down  
22          this path. The first criteria, operational difference,  
23          do you make an operational difference or not?

24          The second criteria, the relationship between  
25          a major line of operation and the resource to do it and

1       you will find this moving into why the package -- the  
2       divisional package. Having looked at the political  
3       requirement for a major -- as an option, you know, the  
4       other options are still on the table, to just go for  
5       supporting, you know, the least you can do and get away  
6       with it, sort of thing. You can do that, still an  
7       option, but on the bigger side, you get a different  
8       picture.

9           Look at the geography of the water down in southern  
10       Iraq, you know, the Basra/Kuwait -- that bit  
11       of space, you don't need to be, again, hugely well  
12       trained to say that looks like a lot of things: securing  
13       the oil wells, securing this, securing that, that looks  
14       like a front-end role for somebody in the Commando. We  
15       happen to have 3 Commando Brigade, classic classic direct match  
16       of utility between task and asset. 3 Commando Brigade  
17       in huge supply in huge demand for exactly that sort of thing. That  
18       couldn't have been done by an armoured brigade or  
19       something like that, it absolutely couldn't. It could  
20       only really have been done so successfully by that  
21       force.

22           Until you got that sorted, Basra was still  
23       a distant, you know -- and if you went, for example,  
24       with only one brigade, you could get to those waters,  
25       but that's it. You would have no combat power to go

1 further. It is an important role, but very much in  
2 support.

3 To go further and take on the Basra thing, you need  
4 another major blob, let me call it a brigade, which sort  
5 of gets you -- you know, gets you to Basra, but unless  
6 you have got another blob or another blob, it doesn't  
7 really give you anything you can get and look at Basra  
8 which is what General Brims did. He laid siege to  
9 Basra, effectively, until he has built up through an  
10 estimate, intelligence machinery and all the rest of it  
11 which would tell him the best way of dealing with the  
12 Basra issue, and he will tell you that when he comes.

13 But that would have been with a two-brigade  
14 structure. Yes, you could do the water -- water and  
15 oil, yes, you could get to Basra and you could look into  
16 Basra and whatever, but couldn't do anything else. To  
17 get into that, you would have to go for a three-blob --

18 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I apologise for interrupting you, but we  
19 are getting slightly off the point. My question was  
20 not: did we end up doing a useful job? Clearly we did.  
21 We did an important job and we clearly did it very well  
22 in the campaign, but the point is that the Americans had  
23 said -- they had made it clear publicly -- that they  
24 could have done the whole thing without our troops on  
25 the ground.

1           In the end, because their Fourth Infantry Division  
2           got stuck up in the north, it was very fortunate for  
3           them that we were there in the south, but at the time we  
4           decided on the recommendation, as we heard yesterday  
5           from the former CDS of the Chiefs of Staff, they  
6           favoured the larger package when, initially, the  
7           political leadership, the Prime Minister and the  
8           Defence Secretary, had actually favoured package 2, the  
9           package without the large land contribution. They  
10          favoured this, and we were told by Lord Boyce and by  
11          Kevin Tebbit, yesterday, that one of the reasons for  
12          doing this was because it would allow us to influence  
13          the way the Americans conducted the campaign, not our  
14          bit of the campaign, but the campaign as a whole.

15          But we ended up, as Lord Boyce told us, unhappy with  
16          the way that they did conduct the campaign, which he  
17          described in rather graphic terms.

18          Now, it was not an unreasonable assumption.  
19          Sir Kevin Tebbit reminded us that in the previous  
20          Gulf War, by committing ourselves to a ground force  
21          contribution, as he said, the planning process opened  
22          completely to us and we were able to influence it. So  
23          that was in the first Gulf War.

24          My question is: in this war, did it actually turn  
25          out that we were unable to influence the way that



1 Rumsfeld and Franks conducted the overall campaign, that  
2 we failed to achieve what we wanted in that sense by  
3 putting in a large land contribution?

4 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Erm, I'm not quite sure --

5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: What was the bottom line? What did we  
6 achieve in terms of influencing the Americans by putting  
7 in a large land contribution?

8 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well, you know the US/UK,  
9 Mil/Mil relationship, you would enhance that no end by  
10 offering this sort of option that eventually was  
11 selected. You would enhance it no end, and that's  
12 a pretty important relationship politically -- I'm  
13 talking on the Mil side -- where we have enormous access  
14 and enormous say in a whole range of things, not just to  
15 do with Iraq, but with other things, because they know  
16 you are a serious player and they know you have got ...  
17 I put that right up at the front of -- at the heart of  
18 the UK/US Mil/Mil relationship, required from a military  
19 perspective a -- hence it coming through from  
20 the military perspective, something meaty to do, and if  
21 there wasn't anything meaty, then we weren't really --  
22 it was a long way to go to do nothing -- you know,  
23 meaty.

24 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it was good for our standing, it was  
25 good for our relationship, but they didn't actually --

1 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Good for future links on future  
2 operations, it's good for sharing intelligence --  
3 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it has some broader benefits --  
4 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: -- it helps with logistics --  
5 SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- but they didn't actually pay attention  
6 to our advice on how these big issues should be handled  
7 in the campaign? They didn't put in enough boots on the  
8 ground, they didn't plan properly for the aftermath, as  
9 Lord Boyce told us yesterday, despite our advice to the  
10 contrary.  
11 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Let me just say a little bit  
12 more about that. Admiral Boyce -- I said I didn't like  
13 the term "aftermath".  
14 SIR RODERIC LYNE: Call it Phase 4, I don't care what you  
15 call it, it went wrong.  
16 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: "Wrong" is too strong --  
17 SIR RODERIC LYNE: We will discuss that separately, but I'm  
18 just trying to get at the heart of why they didn't pay  
19 attention to our concerns, despite the fact that we put  
20 this large pile of chips on the table.  
21 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I don't quite follow why you say  
22 they didn't pay attention.  
23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: I'm just picking up from what Lord Boyce  
24 said.  
25 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I think if you talk to the joint

1 commander who was directly interfaced with  
2 General Franks, and that's the purpose of this, you  
3 would probably get a different flavour. I know you  
4 would. You would get a flavour of, yes, challenges, all  
5 that sort of thing, but leading forward -- if that's  
6 what you want to do, we would have preferred militarily  
7 for decisions earlier and we would have preferred to  
8 have got all the UORs out of the way, and we would have  
9 preferred to have been teed up and ready to go, but life  
10 isn't like that and it certainly isn't like it in this  
11 particular instance.

12 The heart of the issue, personal view on subsequent  
13 operations -- "subsequent operations" rather than  
14 "Phase 4" or "aftermath" -- but this sort of conflict  
15 resolution phase that one was moving into -- and it was  
16 that, it was a conflict resolution. Nobody had won  
17 anything, when the statue was pulled down. Nobody had  
18 won anything. That was the start of the --

19 SIR RODERIC LYNE: President Bush thought he had won  
20 something, he declared "Mission accomplished", but you  
21 disagree with that?

22 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Well I'm just saying...The President can do  
what he

23 likes, he earns more money than I do, but how could it  
24 be? It was not the end of the campaign, it was the end  
25 of a particular and not overtaxing military task to the

1 United States armed forces. Not -- Saddam, without an  
2 air force of substance, without a maritime capability,  
3 et cetera, of a most inshore thing, and with an army that  
4 was suffering still from 1991, which really only had the  
5 Republican Guard, which sounds quite good, but they  
6 weren't terribly effective, and nor were the ordinary  
7 division.

8 It was not a military target of a daunting nature.  
9 Yes, you were going to take casualties. Where were you  
10 going to take them? You were going to take them in the  
11 rear, because that's where the risk was taken: head for  
12 Baghdad, get out of my way, that's where we are going.  
13 17 days later, done, and that's the sort of speed and  
14 tempo that it worked to.

15 You then had all sorts of areas where -- I mean, my  
16 interlocutors were saying to me, and I knew it, it is  
17 the issue of who is in charge of that subsequent  
18 operation, not aftermath and not Phase 4, but this  
19 conflict resolution piece, of which we are now still in.  
20 Not we, I mean, the global international community is still in  
21 that phase. It's after that, there may be a sort of time to  
22 go home but not until that --

23 SIR RODERIC LYNE: So that was the really difficult bit.

24 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: Let me finish on that, because  
25 it is important to your concerns. So, okay, who is in

1 charge of conflict resolution operations? Who is in  
2 charge? There you are -- in the early days, you are  
3 right at the heart of the, you know, the tension -- more  
4 from David Wilson this afternoon, but the tension  
5 between -- the military don't do that sort of thing.  
6 You know, we win the nation's wars, that's what we do.  
7 It is a war-fighting machine, it is geared to that. It  
8 is hugely able at doing that sort of thing and there  
9 isn't another sort of set-up really anywhere that would  
10 remotely match them.

11 So there was no surprise on getting to Baghdad in  
12 17 days, or whether it was going to be 30 days or  
13 whatever. There was no surprise at all. I mean, some  
14 people talked 60 days, 70 days, I don't know what  
15 scenario they were looking at. This was not far, from  
16 Kuwait to Baghdad, drive, get there, and that's -- but  
17 that's not the end of the war.

18 You know, I tried hard -- information ops, you know,  
19 don't play too much on shock and awe and on "We did it",  
20 and "Gotcha", and all these cries, these media cries  
21 that became part of that campaign. If you look at those  
22 media cries, they do not add up to a sensible conflict  
23 resolution strategy. They do not.

24 That, you know, sort of lacuna, I think is  
25 absolutely part of the way forward, you know, from now.

1           So conflict resolution -- and you couldn't pin down  
2           whether the Pentagon was in charge. If so, was it  
3           General Franks, the commander in the field, CentCom in  
4           other words, was it the joint chiefs, was it the  
5           State Department, was it US Aid? Who was in charge?

6           At the time where that longer-term thinking, you  
7           know, was being done, that question remained  
8           uncomfortable for some time.

9           I think you need to look at it -- because it  
10          will keep coming up -- I can only advise on this  
11          sense -- you know, the sort of -- there is a conflict  
12          resolution phase, where the military capabilities that  
13          are on the ground in some area can help within the  
14          short-term. Yes, sticky tape stuff, hearts and minds,  
15          yes, you can mend this and get the lights on, not across  
16          Basra or across Baghdad, you could do it on a tiny sort  
17          of street -- there isn't the resource.

18          To do the strategic conflict resolution operation of  
19          putting Iraq back to the sort of political end-state  
20          that you were looking for, you know, in the world  
21          community ... getting back on to that, I mean, that's  
22          a big strategic thing way beyond this -- way beyond the  
23          sort of planning capability of CentCom or London or  
24          anywhere else. That's what's going on now.

25          So --

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Sir Anthony.

2 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I do think the Phase 4 led

3 people to see it sequentially as opposed to seeing it as

4 a concurrent activity, you know, the whole time.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: This Inquiry in these first sessions since we

6 started, essentially we have been trying to do two

7 things. One is to fill in the narrative, the

8 chronological sequence. Nearly all of that is already

9 in the archive, to which we have access, but it has been

10 very important to get witness testimony, interpretation,

11 of that.

12 The second is to identify the emerging themes and

13 clearly what I'm now inhibited from calling the

14 "aftermath", but the conflict resolution, the

15 reconstruction issue is increasingly looming for us.

16 You have taken us this morning into very much the

17 scoping process, the context, the complexity of

18 everything. I understand you have actually already got

19 the state of intent which was the hook on the wall on

20 which you hung your Mil/Strat process, so that will be

21 interesting to revisit.

22 We are grateful for the evidence. We have now got

23 more military witnesses, so we can, as it were, pursue

24 both the chronology, but also the context you have been

25 helping us with this morning.

1 I think, with that, I will close this session and  
2 thank you very much, Sir Anthony.  
3 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: So, are we -- have I finished  
4 and can go or not?  
5 THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed we have. We are coming back after the  
6 break, I'm sorry. You, Sir Anthony, have given us your  
7 testimony this morning. Thank you. That's it for  
8 today, for you. For the audience, we have  
9 General Wilson returning after the break in about ten  
10 minutes and I hope you will be back in time for that.  
11 Thank you.  
12 LT GEN SIR ANTHONY PIGOTT: I will be a member of the public  
13 for that.  
14 THE CHAIRMAN: As you wish.  
15 (11.25 am)  
16 (Short break)  
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